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1. Introduction 
                                                          

 Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. This article benefited from the excellent comments of 
Sasha Greenawalt and the other attendees of the American Society of International Law International Criminal Law 
Interest Group Workshop at John Marshall Law School. Diane Marie Amann, Andy Gillman, and David Glazier 
were incredibly generous in their comments, suggestions and criticisms. I am grateful to the U.S. Department of 
State for inviting me to present this paper as a Martins Fellow and for the constructive feedback I received. In 
addition, Louise Arimatsu and Michael Schmitt provided valuable comments during the editorial stage. The author 
is indebted to John Engers, Paul Keating, and Mary Sexton for their research assistance.  
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The killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in May 2011 and Anwar al-Aulaqi in Yemen in 
September 2011 both raise the question of when the killing of an identified individual posing a 
threat to a nation-state is lawful.
1
 Although it has not yet been forced to publicly defend either 
killing in any great detail, the Obama Administration has insisted on the legality of both 
operations by deploying an amalgam of legal and rhetorical arguments that explicitly or 
implicitly invoke multiple bodies of law. As an administration spokesperson stated in connection 
with the Bin Laden operation: 
The operation was conducted in a manner fully consistent with the laws of war. 
… There is simply no question that this operation was lawful. Bin Laden was the 
head of al Qaeda, the organization that conducted the attacks of September 11, 
2001. And al Qaeda and bin Laden himself had continued to plot attacks against 
the US. We acted in the nation’s self-defense. The operation was conducted in a 
way designed to minimize and avoid altogether, if possible, civilian casualties.
2
 
In litigation brought by al-Aulaqi’s father in 2010, the Administration likewise argued both that 
Congress authorized the President to use force overseas to protect the U.S. from threats of attack 
and that additional legal authority comes from, inter alia, the inherent right of national self-
defense recognized by international law.
3
  
These statements reveal that the legality of such targeted operations can be evaluated along a 
number of dimensions—under public international law devoted to the jus ad bellum, under 
international humanitarian law and the jus in bello, under international human rights law, and 
under the applicable domestic legal regimes. Of particular relevance in U.S. law are two 
instruments: the long-standing Executive Order proscribing resort to assassination and the 2001 
Authorization to Use Military Force. Common law prohibitions against murder may also apply in 
Pakistan and Yemen.  
Notwithstanding these multiple legal regimes, there is little positive law that speaks definitively 
to the legality vel non of the Bin Laden and al-Aulaqi operations. In particular, the law is not 
entirely clear with respect to: the legality of the United States’ use of force in these foreign 
territories; the United States’ use of lethal force against these two individuals; the reach of the jus 
in bello beyond active theaters of war; and the question of whether the U.S. was under a duty to 
endeavor to capture either Bin Laden or al-Aulaqi rather than kill them outright. In light of the 
gaps in the law on these fundamental questions, a legal analysis of these operations threatens to 
yield a situation of non liquet—“it is not clear.”  
Although the relevant legal regimes developed along different historical, doctrinal, and 
philosophical trajectories, they increasingly collide and even overlap in contemporary 
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. With only rudimentary choice of law tools to 
                                                          
1
 To a certain extent, the attack on Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi’s compound in Tripoli in May 2011, days before the 
Bin Laden raid, also engages these questions. Van Schaack 2011. 
2
 White House Press Secretary 2011. 
3
 Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support of 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Case Civ. A. No. 10-cv-1469, at pp. 4-5 (Sept. 25, 2010) [hereinafter ‘Al-Aulaqi, 
Obama brief’], available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Al-Aulaqi_USG_PI_Opp__MTD_Brief_FILED.pdf. 
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draw upon, it is not yet clear which body of law is authoritative in the event of tensions and 
contradictions between them. Because the doctrinal and conflicts of law questions are difficult to 
sort out in a vacuum, the definitive legality of such events may turn on which domestic or 
international legal forum—if any—ultimately asserts jurisdiction. Judicial review, however, is 
not likely to be forthcoming, given that there are limited fora in which to raise any sort of formal 
legal challenge, there is no obvious sovereign or individual complainant, there is only limited 
personal jurisdiction over potential sovereign and individual respondents, and there are vast 
disparities of power between the U.S. and other involved states. As such, where the law is 
incomplete or indeterminate, a form of jurisprudential relativity sets in, by which states are free 
to make policy choices, subject only to the constraints—none trivial, to be sure—imposed by 
military strategy, diplomatic relations, and the political process.
4
 The multiplicity of legal 
regimes also invites a “mixing and matching” of doctrinal elements that blurs the distinctions 
between the various paradigms and can lead to doctrinal imbalances.  
In the light of the legal indeterminacy surrounding these two operations, this article will 
endeavor to systematically tease out the various arguments advanced in their defense and to map 
the contiguous and overlapping legal regimes that speak to the killing of these two men. I 
compare the legality of the two operations primarily under international law, leaving to others to 
develop whatever domestic constitutional limitations may exist by virtue of the 4
th
 and 5
th
 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The paper outlines several doctrinal pathways within 
international law that lead to the conclusion that both operations were legal. Along the way, I 
identify established landmarks in positive law. Reaching the ultimate destination, however, 
requires one to traverse uncertain terrain by deploying legal theories that remain under-
developed, in flux, and contested. At these crossroads, the necessary arguments often do not 
enjoy textual support in the relevant treaties or reflect consistent state practice or opinio juris. 
Nor are there authoritative judicial pronouncements that provide validation. Furthermore, our 
expedition requires us to navigate between overlapping legal regimes with no compass to help 
resolve potential conflicts of law that arise. In my accounting of this journey, I provide a rather 
cursory treatment of established law and linger more at those junctures that could lead to a 
conclusion of illegality because there is a diversity of viewpoints in the literature. All told, the 
law can be made to work in defense of the United States’ actions, but there are points along the 
way at which an authoritative decision-maker might reach a defensible contrary conclusion.  
Although this paper is primarily about law, the policy implications of these operations are 
momentous.
5
 And, the “should we” question is often as compelling as the “can we” question. 
The U.S. may enjoy a technological monopoly on certain means and methods of warfare for the 
moment. Like the proverbial pocket calculator, however, it is only a matter of time before other 
states and entities have access to the same tools and techniques, given the dizzying pace of 
technological diffusion in war fighting. Any legal claims now employed will be up for grabs for 
other states and entities to appropriate.
6
 And, because polynormativity is unsustainable in any 
system of law, the U.S. precedent will be cited as influential state practice and its legal claims as 
                                                          
4
 Corn and Jenson 2008, at pp.827-28.  
5
 See Blum and Heymann 2010.  
6
 Reisman and Armstrong 2006, at pp.525-6 (noting the mimetic tendency of customary international law 
arguments). 
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authoritative opinio juris, notwithstanding claims of U.S. exceptionalism. From a policy 
perspective, this suggests prudential grounds for caution when operating at the edge of the law.  
2. The Operations and Their Justifications 
Although the complete details of how Osama bin Laden and Anwar al-Aulaqi met their demise 
may never be fully known, it is possible to piece together a composite account by drawing on 
press coverage, government legal briefs, and statements from the Obama Administration. The 
following narratives assume the accuracy of such public records, bearing in mind that much 
relevant information remains classified.  
2.1. Operation Neptune Spear: Osama Bin Laden 
It has been reported that, in the early hours of May 2, 2011, about two dozen Navy SEALs 
departed by helicopter from a base in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, and entered Pakistani sovereign 
territory.
7
 The SEALs were part of the Naval Special Warfare Development Group 
(“DEVGRU”) under the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), a subunified component of 
the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) dedicated to conducting antiterrorism 
operations.
8
 In two helicopters (MH-60 Black Hawks),
9
 the team entered the garrison town of 
Abbottabad and approached a compound that had been under surveillance for months.
10
 The 
original plan was for members of the team to rappel out of the helicopters and raid the compound 
from the roof.
11
 The plan did not unroll as planned, however, when the high temperatures, tall 
security walls, and the thin air of the compound caused one helicopter to “settle with power” and 
crash.
12
 The other helicopter landed, and the SEALs moved toward the buildings in the 
compound after blasting through several internal walls with C-4 explosives. Some accounts tell it 
that the team immediately took fire from in a peripheral building. The source was Abu Ahmed 
al-Kuwaiti, the courier who inadvertently revealed Bin Laden’s whereabouts after a 10-year 
manhunt.
13
 Other accounts suggest that the team was not fired upon until they entered the main 
house and confronted Bin Laden’s son, Khalid, who was armed with an AK-47.14 It now appears 
that these were the only shots fired against the Americans.
15
  
Upon entering the structure where Bin Laden was thought to be residing, the SEAL team 
proceeded to the upper floors, killing Bin Laden’s son on the way up.16 Bin Laden was visually 
identified on an upper floor. Although reports originally suggested that Bin Laden had used one 
                                                          
7
 Schmidle 2011 (on an apparently “insider” account). See also New York Times 2011a; BBC News 2011. 
8
 See generally Feickert 2011. Reports of the Bin Laden raid indicate that while the Pentagon implemented the 
operation, it was carried out under CIA authority. Ambinger 2011. 
9
 It has been surmised that the Pentagon may have developed a stealth helicopter for such missions. Hennigan and 
Vartabedian 2011. See also Shalal-Esa 2011.  
10
 Mazzetti 2011.  
11
 BBC News 2011.  
12
 Shalal-Esa 2011.  
13
 Wilson, Whitlock and Branigan 2011. 
14
 Schmidle 2011. 
15
 Landler and Mazzetti 2011.  
16
 New York Times 2011.  
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of his wives as a human shield,
17
 later accounts suggested that she, her daughter, and/or another 
wife may have tried to position themselves in front of him or even rushed at the SEALs.
18
 
Versions of the story were also conflicting as to whether Bin Laden fired at the U.S. troops when 
he confronted them;
19
 now it appears that he resisted capture,
20
 or seemed ready to resist,
21
 and 
that there were weapons within reach although he was unarmed.
22
 One of the SEALs shot Bin 
Laden in the chest and then the head. All told, four other people were killed in the raid: the 
courier, Bin Laden’s son Khalid, the courier’s brother (who was armed), and the latter’s wife 
(who was not).
23
 One of Bin Laden’s wives was later treated for a bullet wound in her leg.24  
Accounts suggest that Bin Laden made no effort at surrender.
25
 That said, some narratives have 
suggested that the order was made to kill not capture Bin Laden, perhaps due to the spectacle that 
would no doubt have ensued.
26
 This view has been vociferously contradicted by official 
spokespersons, who insist that “consistent with the laws of war, bin Laden’s surrender would 
have been accepted if feasible.”27  
Meanwhile, a rescue MH-47 Chinook helicopter was dispatched. The SEALs destroyed the 
downed helicopter and the troops departed, carrying Bin Laden’s corpse and a voluminous 
amount of intelligence with them. After DNA testing confirmed Bin Laden’s identity, his 
remains were given Islamic funeral rites and were wrapped in a burial shroud. After the Saudi 
government indicated that it did not want the body, Bin Laden’s corpse was dumped into the 
Arabian Sea from the aircraft carrier, USS Carl Vinson.
28
  
2.2. Anwar Al-Aulaqi  
Al-Aulaqi, a dual U.S.-Yemeni citizen whose parents left the U.S. when he was seven, was an al 
Qaida cleric, ideologue, and propagandist.
29
 Although once a seemingly moderate voice, Al-
Aulaqi’s lectures had increasingly been linked to attacks around the world, such as the violent 
rampage by Major Nidal Malik Hasan in Texas, and the attempted Northwest Airlines bombing 
by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, both in 2009.
30
 Originally the editor of Inspire, al Qaida’s 
jihadist magazine, al-Aulaqi was alleged to have increasingly assumed an operational role in al 
                                                          
17
 Wilson, Whitlock and Branigan 2011.  
18
 Drogin, Parsons and Dilanian 2011.  
19
 The White House Blog 2011 (“After a firefight, they killed Osama bin Laden and took custody of his body.”). 
20
 Drogin, Parsons and Dilanian 2011.  
21
 Waraich 2011. 
22
 Williams 2011.  
23
 Worldwatch 2011. 
24
 Wilson, Whitlock and Branigan 2011.  
25
 Williams 2011 (quoting Attorney General Eric Holder to the effect that “‘If he had attempted to surrender, I think 
we should obviously have accepted that, but there was no indication that he wanted to do that. And therefore his 
killing was appropriate.’”). 
26
 See Robertson 2011. 
27
 White House Press Secretary 2011. See also Drogin, Parsons and Dilanian 2011; Brennan 2011.  
28
 Drogin, Parsons and Dilanian 2011.  
29
 New York Times 2011b. 
30
 Mazzetti, Schmitt and Worth 2011. 
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Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
31
 by, for example, recruiting members, facilitating 
training camps, fundraising, and planning attacks on the U.S.
32
  
Al-Aulaqi had been in U.S. sights for some time. It was reported that he had been placed on a list 
of individuals whom the Joint Special Operations Command, tasked with tracking suspected 
terrorists, was specifically authorized to kill.
33
 This list is colloquially called the “kill or capture 
list.”34 Since at least April 2010, al-Aulaqi was on a separate list of suspected terrorists whom the 
CIA was authorized to kill.
35
 The Treasury Department also included him on a list of Specially 
Designated Global Terrorists suspected of “supporting acts of terrorism and for acting for or on 
behalf of AQAP.”36 Pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1267, he was identified as an 
individual associated with al Qaida and thus subjected to a global asset freeze and travel ban.
37
 
The revelation that the National Security Council had authorized al-Aulaqi’s killing provoked a 
lawsuit by al-Aulaqi’s father and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) seeking injunctive 
relief,
38
 which failed on standing and political question grounds.
39
  
Al-Aulaqi had apparently evaded drone attacks in December 2009 and May 2011.
40
 He was 
finally killed in a remote area of Northern Yemen on September 30, 2011, by a Hellfire missile 
fired from a Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) deployed from a base somewhere in the Arabian 
Peninsula. The drone was likely operated by the CIA, although some reports suggest 
involvement by JSOC.
41
 Killed along with him was another U.S. citizen, Samir Khan, who also 
edited Inspire. There is no indication that the U.S. was aware of Khan’s presence in the convoy 
in question, but his death has not been treated solely as collateral damage.
42
 This was not the first 
such operation outside of Afghanistan or a recognized theater of war.
43
 That distinction goes to 
the November 2002 drone attack in Yemen that killed another U.S. citizen, Kamal Derwish 
                                                          
31
 On January 19, 2010, Secretary of State Clinton designated AQAP as a Foreign Terrorist Organization pursuant to 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 9 U.S.C. §1189. 
32
 Shane 2010. See also Al-Aulaqi, Obama brief, supra n.3 at pp.1, 6, 21 (arguing that al-Aulaqi assumed an 
“operational leadership role” in AQAP); Al Aulaqi v. Obama et al, Unclassified Declaration in Support of Formal 
Claim of State Secrets Privilege by James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, at paras.13-17 (Sept. 24, 
2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/statesec/aulaqi-clapper-092510.pdf. 
33
 Priest 2010. 
34
 Hosenball 2011. 
35
 Miller 2010. For a discussion of the legal and policy implications of generating secret “kill or capture” lists, 
particularly given the lack of transparency and accountability, see Alston 2011. 
36
 Designation of Anwar Al-Aulaqi Pursuant to Executive Order 13224 and the Global Terrorism Sanctions 
Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 594, 75 Fed. Reg. 43233, 43234 (July 23, 2010). See Fox News 2010. 
37
 Security Council Resolution 1267, 15 October 1999, S/Res/1267, para.4. 
38
 Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, Case 1:10-cv-01469, Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Aug. 30, 2010), 
available at http://www.aclu.org/national-security/al-aulaqi-v-obama-complaint [hereinafter ‘Al-Aulaqi 
Complaint’]. 
39
 Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010). 
40
 Mazzetti, Schmitt and Worth 2011.  
41
 Mazzetti, Schmitt and Worth 2011. 
42
 Hosenball 2011. But see Finn 2011. Collateral damage is defined as “incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians and damage to civilian objects.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
‘API’], art 57(2) (a) (ii). 
43
 The theater of war, also known as the area of operations, encompasses locations where actual military operations 
are taking place. Greenwood 2008, at para.53. 
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(a.k.a. Ahmed Hijazi). In that attack, CIA operatives based in Djibouti killed six alleged al Qaida 
members, including the individual then considered the head of al Qaida in Yemen.
44
 These 
operations have continued. In October 2011, al-Aulaqi’s teen-aged son, Abdul Rahman Al-
Aulaqi (also an American citizen), and Ibrahim al-Banna, another AQAP media chief, were 
killed by a drone.
45
  
2.3. Evolving Narratives and Appraisals 
In the evolving narratives of what happened during these two incidents, an amalgam of different 
bodies of law, legal rules, and moral principles have been invoked. Official and unofficial 
statements by Obama Administration officials concerning these and related operations engage 
complex public international law principles concerned with: the legality of the sovereign use of 
force extraterritorially; the concept of combatant status and combat function within international 
humanitarian law (IHL); the principles of self-defense, distinction, and proportionality; and the 
applicability of human rights obligations extraterritorially. In these accounts, it is not clear 
wshether a single theory of legality is being advanced, or if there are multiple legal claims that 
provide alternative, or perhaps even mutually reinforcing, legal bases. Moreover, where multiple 
legal paradigms are invoked, there is a risk of taking the sugar without the salt: relying on 
permissive doctrinal elements while overlooking limitations or restrictions that exist to protect 
against excesses or abuse. 
A primary articulated justification for both operations is “national self-defense.”46 The self-
defense imperative operates to justify both the incursion into Pakistani territory without 
Pakistan’s consent (assuming Yemen’s consent to the presence of the drone in question) as well 
as the use of lethal force against the two men.
47
 Even absent any territorial breach, self-defense 
has been invoked to provide a continuous targeting authority against individuals associated with 
al Qaida who pose a threat to the U.S. and its interests.
48
 Appealing to self-defense as a public 
international law principle, however, requires a more lenient conception of what constitutes an 
imminent threat than would be acceptable under classic articulations of the doctrine. This 
doctrinal expansion is justified, according to the Administration, because “the threats posed by 
non-state actors do not present themselves in the ways that evidenced imminence in more 
traditional conflicts.”49 While self-defense has historically been cited in connection with attacks 
on hostile governments or military installations, invoking it in connection with these types of 
individualized operations outside of a law enforcement context is novel.  
A separate rationale also appears in government statements: that both men were lawful military 
objectives according to the principle of distinction who were engaged in an armed conflict 
against the U.S. that is governed by IHL. In a blog post after the Bin Laden operation, State 
Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh stated, 
                                                          
44
 Abu Ali Al-Harithi had been associated with the attack on the USS The Sullivans and USS Cole in 2000 in 
Yemen. Derwish was suspected of being the ringleader of the Lackawanna Six terrorist cell. McManus 2003.  
45
 Kasinof 2011. 
46
 Brennan 2011. See also Koh 2010. 
47
 Williams 2011. 
48
 Brennan 2011. But in contrast, see Janin 2007, at p.98.  
49
 Brennan 2011. 
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Given bin Laden’s unquestioned leadership position within al Qaeda and his clear 
continuing operational role, there can be no question that he was the leader of an 
enemy force and a legitimate target in our armed conflict with al Qaeda.
50
  
The accounts of the Bin Laden mission also emphasize that the IHL principles of distinction and 
proportionality were strictly adhered to,
51
 and that American lives were at risk.
52
 This latter 
observation implies that the U.S. did not prioritize force protection over the principle of 
proportionality, which protects civilians from harm. This comment implicitly differentiates this 
operation from those involving the use of drones, such as the al-Aulaqi operation, which lack the 
element of reciprocity of risk. 
Other statements, however, go beyond self-defense and the law of armed conflict and sound 
more of revenge and reprisal.
53
 For example, in the first appearance by an Obama administration 
Cabinet official following the Bin Laden operation, Attorney General Eric Holder stated that Bin 
Laden:  
was the head of al-Qaida, an organization that had conducted the attacks of 
September 11th. He admitted his involvement and he indicated that he would not 
be taken alive.
54
 
President Obama himself simply noted that “justice has been done.”55  
Fewer official details have emerged about the al-Aulaqi operation, as it is still deemed a covert 
action. A government spokesperson did describe al-Aulaqi as a leader of, and recruiter for, 
AQAP, which has been deemed a threat to the U.S.
56
 The Justice Department reportedly 
produced a detailed memorandum ex ante setting forth the legal bases for placing al-Aulaqi on 
the JSOC list of potential targets, but this reasoning has not been publicly released (or 
acknowledged).
57
 The memo apparently grapples with the question of whether the law-of-war 
rationale so prominent in the Bin Laden case is equally applicable when dealing with someone 
affiliated with an organization formed well after 9/11 with uncertain connections to al Qaida 
proper.
58
 The fact that al-Aulaqi was a U.S. citizen evidently problematized, but did not alter, the 
memo’s ultimate conclusion of legality.59  
In the most comprehensive articulation of the Obama Administration’s counterterrorism policy 
to date, John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, 
reiterated that the U.S. was engaged in a global armed conflict with al Qaida that is not restricted 
                                                          
50
 Koh 2011. 
51
 Williams 2011 
52
 White House Press Secretary 2011. 
53
 Amnesty International 2011.  
54
 Williams 2011. 
55
 White House Blog 2011. 
56
 Tapper 2011. 
57
 See Finn 2011. As this article was going to press, it was announced that the Obama Administration would reveal 
publicly the legal reasoning behind the decision to kill al-Aulaqi. See Klaidman (2012). 
58
 Cole 2011. 
59
 Johnson 2011. 
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to “hot” battlefields, like Afghanistan.60 He emphasized that the “Administration’s 
counterterrorism efforts outside of Afghanistan and Iraq are focused on those individuals who 
are a threat to the U.S., whose removal would cause a significant—even if only temporary—
disruption of the plans and capabilities of al-Qa’ida and its associated forces.”61 This statement 
embodies twin justifications for resorting to lethal force—national defense and the IHL principle 
of distinction. It is unclear if these are alternative, or mutually reinforcing rationales, for such 
operations.
62
 If the killings are lawful under IHL, no separate self-defense rationale seems 
necessary, except to justify the breach of Pakistani territory.
63
 Indeed, if IHL is applicable, it is 
unclear if a self-defense rationale remains viable or if IHL targeting rules occupy the field under 
a theory of lex specialis just as international human rights may be subordinated to IHL in 
situations of armed conflict. If IHL is not applicable, the two individuals retained the full force of 
their international human rights not to be arbitrarily killed.  
Notwithstanding these arguments in favor of the operations’ legality, the attacks raised distinct 
international law concerns from other perspectives.
64
 Some voices from the right and left—
including those from major civil rights organizations—invoked international human rights law 
exclusively and went so far as to characterize the operations as extrajudicial killings
65
 or targeted 
assassinations.
66
 Indeed, Christof Heyns, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary 
or Arbitrary Executions, and Martin Sheinin, the then-Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, requested 
more details about the Bin Laden operation. In particular, they sought clarification about whether 
capture was genuinely contemplated in order to address questions about whether the attack was 
legally justifiable and consistent with the United States’ international human rights obligations.67 
The al-Aulaqi killing has raised even more dissension in light of his U.S. citizenship, the lack of 
certainty about his role in al Qaida and the group’s links to AQAP, and the loose nexus between 
the operation and any extant armed conflict.
68
 Heyns in particular has been quoted as saying, 
“the current use of drones and raids into countries where there is not a recognised armed conflict 
to kill an opponent, such as in Pakistan or Yemen, is highly problematic.”69  
Although academics and human rights organizations voiced these concerns, neither operation 
generated full-throated opprobrium from other states.
70
 Several legal and non-legal explanations 
for this apparent sovereign acceptance (or at least acquiescence) suggest themselves. These 
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include: the realist recognition of the United States’ position in the world as a global superpower, 
the feeling of many that both operations reached desirable outcomes, and the attitude that there 
may be certain individuals whose conduct is so heinous that they are—in a sense—outside the 
law.
71
 Government elites may feel these actions are either legal, or—if not legal—then 
legitimate.
72
 We may never know, however, whether U.S. officials received a 
diplomatic scolding—or more congratulations—outside the public eye.73 Subtle public 
references, however, suggest that not all of the United States’ actions have garnered unwavering 
support from other nations, even from the country’s closest allies. The former Legal Adviser of 
the U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office has, for example, written that the U.S. “sees the 
conflict against Al Qaeda as without geographic limit…. Key allies see it differently, as a 
conflict geographically limited to ‘hot battlefields.’”74 In any case, there can be no doubt that the 
complexity of the international legal questions raised, and the persistent uncertainty about the 
relevant law, contributed to the muting of potential critical responses. It is to these issues that I 
now turn.  
3. Adherence to the Jus ad Bellum 
Turning to the operative international law, two bodies of public international law directly 
regulate a state’s use of armed force: the jus ad bellum and jus in bello, which govern the right to 
use force and the type and degree of force used in an armed conflict, respectively. The 
consequences of violating the jus ad bellum are different than those of violating the jus in bello. 
The former protects sovereign values, and violations for the moment give rise only to state 
responsibility.
75
 The latter protects individuals and may lead to individual responsibility in 
addition to state responsibility. 
Starting with the jus ad bellum, both operations prompt a preliminary inquiry into the question of 
whether the U.S. was entitled—under international law and domestic law—to employ force in 
Pakistan and Yemen, two sovereign countries with which the U.S. is not at war. While regulating 
the use of force is a central feature of international law, elements of U.S. domestic law—
including the 1973 War Powers Resolution,
76
 the 2001 Authorization to Use Force,
77
 and other 
constitutional and statutory provisions allocating the country’s war powers—are also 
authoritative.  
As discussed below, the jus ad bellum provokes a more searching inquiry with respect to the Bin 
Laden operation, given the apparent lack of Pakistani consent to the SEALs’ incursion. By 
contrast, the al-Aulaqi operation appears to have had the benefit of Yemen’s consent and perhaps 
its involvement. As such, the U.N. Charter-based jus ad bellum is largely silent in this latter 
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context.
78
 By contrast, one reaches crisscrossing conclusions with respect to the legality of the 
operation under domestic law. While the Bin Laden operation seems to fall squarely within 
AUMF enacted following the September 11
th
 attacks, the al-Aulaqi operation has a more 
uncertain domestic-law footing. Even assuming no violation of either territorial state’s 
sovereignty, the jus ad bellum provides an uncertain justification for the use of deadly force 
against these two men absent a more imminent threat.  
3.1. International Law Aspects of the Jus Ad Bellum 
The U.N. Charter framework dictates that Article 2(4)’s use of force prohibition is an obligation 
erga omnes. The threat of transnational terrorism, however, has given rise to security 
imperatives—and concomitant legal arguments—that strain the classic jus ad bellum. This 
section recaps the basic tenets of this body of law and evaluates several theories that have been, 
or may be, employed to justify the United States’ uses of force in these instances, including 
consent, self-defense, and a state of necessity.
79
 Although a self-defense rationale is ultimately 
the most defensible jus-ad-bellum justification for the breach of Pakistan’s territorial integrity 
occasioned by the Bin Laden operation, it is not unassailable. By contrast, consent provides an 
easy answer to the question of the legality of the American incursion into Yemen. A free-
standing self-defense doctrine, independent of any territorial breach, also offers a justification for 
both killings, although the availability of this defense as articulated remains open to debate given 
the standard formulation of the doctrine.  
3.1.1. Consent  
Article 2(4) is not implicated where the territorial state consents to foreign intervention.
80
 There 
is little indication that Pakistan was aware of the Bin Laden operation, let alone that it consented 
to it. This lack of consent potentially distinguishes the Bin Laden operation from the so-called 
“drone wars”81 in Waziristan and the other Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in 
northwest Pakistan. These latter operations likely enjoy at least some tacit diplomatic 
acquiescence, even though Pakistani officials occasionally publicly criticize them for domestic 
political consumption.
82
 Consent to action in FATA would not necessarily extend to the Bin 
Laden raid, however.
83
 All that said, we may never know for sure whether Pakistan had at some 
time offered its open-ended consent to an operation of this kind notwithstanding the domestic 
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unpalatability of such an authorization. In addition, it could be argued that Pakistan consented to 
the operation ex post, thus forgoing any claims based on the territorial breach.
84
 In any case, the 
ensuing analysis assumes a lack of Pakistani consent at the time of the operation. 
The viability of a consent defense to a breach of Article 2(4) is a major distinction between the 
Bin Laden and al-Aulaqi attacks, the latter of which was implemented with Yemen’s consent 
and, to a certain extent, assistance.
85
 The only potential impediment to this conclusion turns on 
whether any offer of consent from the territorial state must be explicit and public to satisfy 
Article 2(4). This position is not strongly supported in the law; even if good policy, it may also 
be unreasonable.
86
 While Yemen can consent to another state entering its territory, however, it 
cannot consent to that state violating IHL or human rights law while there. Thus, some lawful 
justification for the use of deadly force must still be identified.  
3.1.2. Self-Defense 
The doctrine of self-defense appears in multiple incarnations in this analysis. The first is as a 
U.N. Charter-based exception to Article 2(4)’s principle of sovereign inviolability. This 
permutation of self-defense governs inter-state relations and has been employed to justify the 
violation of Pakistani territory and Article 2(4) in light of the threat posed by Bin Laden and his 
organization. A second form of the defense, not likely applicable under the facts as we know 
them, derives from standard criminal law doctrine and operates to justify an individual’s use of 
deadly force in a face-to-face confrontation with another individual posing a distinct threat to the 
actor or to third parties.
87
 A third version is the most unsettled in the law. This variant operates as 
a free-standing justification for a nation to employ deadly force against particular individuals 
who pose a national threat, but not necessarily an immediate threat at the time they are targeted. 
As articulated, this justification for deadly force exists even absent any territorial breach, state of 
armed conflict, or imminent threat as required in the criminal law context and provides 
continuous targeting authority with respect to individuals deemed dangerous to a particular 
nation. The two relevant versions of the self-defense doctrine will be considered in turn.  
3.1.2.1. Self-Defense as a Defense to the Article 2(4) Breach 
Absent Pakistan’s consent, the Bin Laden raid resulted in a prima facie breach of that country’s 
sovereignty within the meaning of Article 2(4) of the Charter. The primary argument advanced 
to justify this use of force is that the U.S. was exercising its inherent right—and sovereign 
duty—of self-defense,88 a codified exception to the general prohibition on the use of force in the 
U.N. Charter.
89
 The Charter-based theory of self-defense is that since at least September 11, if 
not earlier, the U.S. has been subjected to a continuous armed attack and an ongoing risk of 
further attacks from al Qaida, with Bin Laden at the helm. This risk of future attacks is cited to 
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justify the incursion into Pakistani territory. Notwithstanding this apparent Charter-based 
justification, a number of legal and factual hurdles exist to a smooth application of established 
self-defense doctrine in these circumstances. 
For one, Article 51 by its terms is triggered by the commission of an “armed attack.” Although 
the precise definition of “armed attack” remains the subject of dispute,90 there was virtual 
international unanimity that the attacks of September 11
th
 satisfied any necessary gravity 
threshold (from the perspective of scale and effect) to constitute such an attack. There is no 
precise formula for evaluating the temporal relationship and the degree of immediacy between 
the armed attack and the defensive response. At the moment, however, these tragic events might 
be deemed too long-passed to provide the predicate legal foundation for the operation under 
consideration absent some theory of extended or open-ended self-defense.
91
  
It may be possible to accumulate effectuated and attempted attacks (starting with the embassy 
bombings through the failed Christmas bombing) against the U.S. both prior and subsequent to 
September 11
th
 to justify a sustained invocation of self-defense. According to this so-called 
pinprick theory, such a chain of events indicates a strong likelihood of future attacks and gives 
rise to a potentially indefinite, but certainly protracted, right to engage in defensive action,
92
 even 
when no particular attack is in progress that would, on its own, support a right to respond.
93
 A 
state might then maintain a defensive response for some time in order to neutralize the ongoing 
threat. While it is possible to identify multiple armed attacks against the U.S. emanating from al 
Qaida proper, it is harder to do so with respect to AQAP if that is the relevant entity for 
analyzing the Al-Aulaqi operation. Although certain attempted attacks have been publicly 
attributed to AQAP, it remains uncertain whether any one act, or the acts taken together, has 
reached the necessary intensity to constitute an “armed attack” against the U.S. within the 
meaning of Article 51. 
It is widely held that, notwithstanding the textual formulation of Article 51, international law 
continues to recognize some notion of anticipatory (as opposed to reactive) self-defense, such 
that a state need not await the launching of an attack in order to respond defensively.
94
 
Historically, as articulated in the exchange of notes generated in connection with the 1837 
Caroline incident, any notion of preemptive self-defense required proof that the attack be 
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imminent, such that the defensive imperative is “instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice of 
means and no moment for deliberation.”95 By this formulation, a state enjoys no privilege to act 
in the face of mere threats, remote risks, or inchoate dangers.
96
  
This high barrier to action remains controversial and would render unlawful many efforts at 
anticipatory self-defense. The so-called Bush Doctrine, embodied in the President’s 2002 
National Security Strategy, endeavored to augment the right of anticipatory self-defense by 
relaxing the immediacy standard to allow for preventative attacks where there is a serious threat 
to American security but no concrete attack in progress.
97
 Although compelling and influential,
98
 
it is doubtful whether this approach has been fully accepted by other members of the 
international community
99
 such that it can be said with confidence that a new customary norm 
has developed.
100
 Nonetheless, a self-defense rationale for the use of force in Pakistan requires 
the acceptance of some notion of anticipatory—indeed preventative—self-defense. This is 
because there is no suggestion that the U.S. was aware of any impending attacks being 
orchestrated by Bin Laden, although intelligence gleaned from seized materials suggests that 
future attacks were indeed contemplated.
101
 
The risk of relaxing the immediacy requirement is that the self-defense exception could be 
invoked to mask unlawful aggressive acts or punitive measures taken in reprisal or retaliation. 
Although there are sources of international law that categorically prohibit reprisals,
102
 military 
operations such as Operation Infinite Reach launched in response to the 1998 embassy bombings 
may suggest enduring support, and a continuing utility, for such a concept.
103
 This is especially 
compelling given the difficulty of distinguishing between self-help actions taken in reprisal and 
those taken in genuine self-defense. 
Another challenge to positioning the raid within the archetypical self-defense framework is that, 
by some accounts, the right of self-defense applies only in response to an armed attack by 
another sovereign entity, even though no such limitation appears in Article 51 itself. The 
International Court of Justice has adopted this position, even following the attacks of September 
11
th
.
104
 By this rationale, measures in self-defense may only be exercised against the state legally 
responsible for the initial attack. Because Pakistan did not engage in an armed attack against the 
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U.S., and no one is arguing that Bin Laden’s actions may be attributed to that country, Article 51 
would thus be inapplicable to justify the United States’ use of force on Pakistani territory. There 
are indications, however, that the classically statist interpretation of Article 51 has given way to a 
more expansive and realistic view in light of the increasing threat posed by non-state actors in 
international relations.
105
 Both the Security Council
106
 and the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance 
(NATO)
107
 invoked the right of self-defense following the attacks of September 11
th
, recognizing 
a more fulsome range of potential sovereign threats. This suggests that the Court’s majority 
approach fails to fully correspond with state practice.
108
 This may also signal either the 
emergence of a new custom
109
 or the survival or revival of pre-Charter customary law.
110
 
At a minimum, the right to use force in self-defense against non-state actors may extend to 
situations in which the target state is advertently or even inadvertently harboring militants,
111
 
given that the due diligence principle obliges states to prevent their territory from being used to 
the detriment of other states.
112
 This obligation—which finds affinity in doctrines of neutrality 
originating in the law of armed conflict
113—exists even when the acts of such non-state actors 
cannot be formally attributed to the territorial state under the Nicaragua effective control 
threshold
114
 or other tests of state responsibility.
115
 As former Secretary of State George Shultz 
argued, this position is based on the proposition that international law does not prohibit a state 
from “attacking [terrorists] on the soil of other nations … or from using force against States that 
support, train, and harbor terrorists or guerrillas.”116 Similar operations in the past, however, 
have provoked condemnation as violations of the territorial state’s sovereignty. For example, in 
1988, the Security Council considered Israel’s “assassination” in Tunisia of an alleged Palestine 
Liberation Organization leader, Khalil El Wazir, to be an act of aggression
117—one of the few 
instances in which the Council employed that term to describe the unlawful use of force by a 
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state.
118
 Likewise, states objected to Operation Phoenix, launched by Colombia into Ecuador to 
pursue Raul Reyes and other Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia guerrillas, although 
ultimately Colombia was not sanctioned in any meaningful way for its actions.
119
 In a post-9/11 
world, however, the international community (or at least powerful states) may evince greater 
tolerance for states taking defensive action within the territories of other states that are unwilling 
or unable to repress irregular fighters in their midst, even if the territorial state could not be held 
legally responsible for the acts of those militants. The theory is that such states forfeit their right 
to noninterference when they fail to deal with such transnational security threats.
120
  
The case at bar presents some special considerations because the government of Pakistan has 
been under a continuing Security Council-imposed duty
121
 since before September 11
th
 to refrain 
from, and ensure that its nationals refrain from, harboring or assisting in any way Bin Laden and 
those who associate with him.
122
 The most robust obligations in this regard are contained in 
Resolution 1373, which obliged all states to “deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, 
support, or commit terrorist acts” and “prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit 
terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those purposes against other states or their 
citizens.”123 Indeed, one wonders how Bin Laden’s whereabouts in a fortified compound in the 
vicinity of an elite military academy for the past five years could possibly have been unknown to 
the Pakistani government.
124
 This suggests that elements of the Pakistani government are 
incompetent, implicated, or woefully ignorant about events in their own territory. Regardless of 
which portrait is accurate, Pakistan’s unwillingness or inability to act against Bin Laden offers a 
partial justification for the United States’ resort to defensive self-help in its territory.125  
By some accounts, if the territorial state is making a good faith effort to address the presence of 
armed groups in its midst, there is no right to use force in self-defense.
126
 Others argue that the 
right to intervene with force exists only so long as some level of prior notice to, and consultation 
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with, the implicated territorial state is undertaken absent evidence of collusion.
127
 According to 
Abe Sofaer, a former State Department Legal Adviser: 
While the U.S. regards attacks on terrorists being protected in the sovereign 
territory of other States as potentially justifiable when undertaken in self-defense, 
a State’s ability to establish the legality of such an action depends on its 
willingness openly to accept responsibility for the attack, to explain the basis for 
its action, and to demonstrate that reasonable efforts were made prior to the attack 
to convince the State whose territorial sovereignty was violated to prevent the 
offender’s unlawful activities from occurring.128  
In addition, assuming it applies in one of the forms discussed above, the inherent right of 
sovereign self-defense is limited as a matter of customary international law by the twin principles 
of necessity and proportionality.
129
 These principles place a check on each use of force after the 
outbreak of armed violence.
130
 The principle of necessity mandates that any response in self-
defense be strictly and objectively essential to protect core interests of the defending state and be 
a last resort after more peaceful means (such as diplomacy) are exhausted or deemed futile.
131
 
Proportionality in the jus ad bellum requires that any response to an armed attack be calibrated to 
repel the original attack and prevent future attacks.
132
 Although no strict one-to-one force ratio is 
required, the operation as a whole should be proportionate to the original transgression in terms 
of scale of the response, the targets chosen, type and degree of force employed, and the results to 
be achieved.
133
 The principle of proportionality might thus bar a state from widening the scope of 
the conflict, for example to new territories.
134
 To the extent that non-state actors are the source of 
the threat, any right to engage in acts in self-defense would normally be confined to terrorist 
targets as contrasted to the infrastructure or installations of the territorial state,
135
 except 
potentially in situations in which there is a high degree of symbiosis between the group and the 
host state.
136
  
As a final constraint on invoking self-defense, Article 51 contains several procedural 
requirements, namely notification to the Security Council. These were adhered to in the 
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immediate aftermath of 9/11, although not since.
137
 These requirements are not generally deemed 
an absolute precondition for invoking the defense, although they are relevant to evaluating the 
authenticity of a state’s claim of self-defense.138 
Any requirement to cooperate with the host state was clearly not satisfied in the Bin Laden 
killing.
139
 Accounts indicate that although the U.S. contemplated involving Pakistani authorities 
in the operation, it ultimately resolved to act unilaterally.
140
 It is clear, however, that little to no 
harm was done to Pakistani territory, which speaks to proportionality of response. In both cases, 
targeting a particular individual is a smaller-scale response than might be tolerated in light of the 
risks posed to the U.S. by al Qaida writ large and even by AQAP. In terms of necessity, 
decapitating a non-state group may result in its dissolution, disbanding, or considerable 
weakening, especially when the group is dominated by a messianic figure such as Bin Laden or 
al-Aulaqi.
141
 Indeed, the Bin Laden plan was surgical by design to avoid confrontation with 
Pakistani authorities and damage to public infrastructure.
142
 That said, the U.S. government has 
admitted that there were contingency plans in place in the event that the team was confronted by 
Pakistani military or police forces and had to fight their way out of the country.
143
 Nonetheless, 
because there was no clear predicate armed attack and no imminent threat in the scenarios under 
consideration, neither operation fully complies with standard self-defense doctrine. 
3.1.2.2. A Free-Standing Right of Self-Defense  
The doctrine of self-defense has historically applied to national decisions to deploy military 
might on a macro scale against a threat to the nation. In the two scenarios under review, the unit 
of analysis is much smaller—the target is a single dangerous individual rather than a foreign 
regime or even a military asset or installation. This micro-level self-defense rationale does not 
seek to justify a violation of Article 2(4) by virtue of the use of force by a state in another 
sovereign’s territory. Nor does it seek to justify individual action (i.e., by any one SEAL 
member) in the face of an imminent personal threat. Rather, the second relevant self-defense 
rationale is more in the nature of a hybrid of the classic jus ad bellum and criminal law versions 
of self-defense.
144
 It also finds affinity in status-based targeting doctrines contained in IHL, 
although it is applied in situations outside of armed conflict when IHL is silent.  
Presumably, this rationale is still bottomed on Article 51, which articulates a right to engage in 
defensive action absent any actual or anticipated breach of Article 2(4). If so, however, the 
textual necessity of a predicate armed attack and the debate over anticipatory self-defense remain 
paramount. All told, it is difficult to rely upon Article 51 for a continuous targeting authority 
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against individuals posing a more diffuse threat to the nation. If the Article 51-based 
requirements for self-defense cannot be met, this rationale must find expression in customary 
international law that either pre-dates or coexists alongside the U.N. Charter. The most 
applicable state practice may be the Israeli action in Tunisia, which was not well-received 
internationally.
145
 That said, the Tunisia episode was pre-9/11 and did not involve an individual 
of Bin Laden’s infamy, so a blanket rule may no longer be valid.  
Assuming such a continuous targeting authority exists, necessity remains to be established: that 
each man posed a sufficient enough threat to justify the use of lethal force and that there were no 
other operational means to suppress this threat. Certainly, if Bin Laden still had operational or 
financial control over al Qaida activities, his killing would eliminate a serious and continuing 
threat to the U.S., but that does not fully answer the question of necessity. The targetability of al-
Aulaqi under such a self-defense rationale may be more contestable. This is where it becomes 
important to establish his actions and role beyond the vituperative propaganda that is available in 
the public record, unless such calls to jihad constitute a sufficient threat to the U.S.—a 
proposition that is difficult to endorse in light of the United States’ constitutional devotion to free 
speech principles. However, the U.S. has never had to fully establish al-Aulaqi’s role in AQAP 
or provide solid evidence of his conduct beyond his ideological rants. In either case, invoking a 
self-defense rationale for the killing of a single individual is very far from the original paradigm, 
which is addressed to neutralizing a more macro sovereign threat. Indeed, it operates more like a 
conflation of jus ad bellum self-defense concepts with jus in bello targeting rules.  
3.1.3. A State of Necessity 
A final argument that might have been invoked to preclude any wrongfulness of the United 
States’ conduct is the existence of a general state of necessity not presenting a case of self-
defense stricto sensu.
146
 The freeform principle of necessity finds expression in Article 25 of the 
International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts; it also finds resonance in general principles of criminal law.
147
 The Articles state 
that necessity may not be invoked unless the otherwise unlawful act: 
(a) is the only means for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave 
and imminent peril; and  
(b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards 
which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole.
148
 
This defense cannot, however, be invoked to justify or excuse the impairment of an essential 
interest of another state or to breach a peremptory rule of international law,
149
 such as Article 
2(4) of the Charter,
150
 limitations on the use of deadly force in IHL, or human rights law.
151
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In his discussion of the circumstances negating the wrongfulness of a state’s conduct, Roberto 
Ago as the ILC’s Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility opined that a state of necessity 
might, as a standalone imperative, preclude the wrongfulness of limited (in terms of duration and 
the means employed) sorties into sovereign territory falling short of acts of aggression. Ago 
specifically mentions the example of “incursions into foreign territory to forestall harmful 
operations by an armed groups which was preparing to attack the territory of the State.”152 The 
ICJ has made clear, however, that although such a defense may exist in customary international 
law, it is circumscribed such that it may only be invoked on an “exceptional basis” and under 
“strictly confined conditions.”153 In particular, the impugned conduct must be responsive to an 
imminent peril and be the sole means available to the responding state to safeguard an essential 
interest against such a danger.
154
  
The high threshold for invoking the defense as formulated by the ILC and the ICJ means that it is 
difficult to apply to the incidents under consideration—which involve territorial intervention and 
the application of deadly force—notwithstanding that Bin Laden and al-Aulaqi had eluded 
capture in the past and that Pakistan and Yemen are undependable allies. A more micro 
application of the doctrine of necessity may, however, be useful in tandem with the self-defense 
doctrine to justify not informing Pakistan of the impending raid and other departures from the 
strict requirements of standard self-defense doctrine. 
3.2. Domestic Law Aspects of the Jus Ad Bellum 
Although the two operations prompt an immediate consideration of the international jus ad 
bellum, domestic law is implicated as well. The attack on Bin Laden had unequivocal 
authorization under U.S. law in the form of the 2001 AUMF, which remains extant.
155
 The 
AUMF, whose preamble invokes the right of self-defense,
156
 authorized the President to  
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or 
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist 
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001...
157
 
In this way, the AUMF explicitly sanctions uses of force against the plotters of the attacks of 
September 11
th
 and was drafted with Bin Laden in mind. Indeed, the operation arguably 
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accomplished exactly what Congress had in mind upon passage of the AUMF, albeit a decade 
later. The only wrinkle concerns whether members of the CIA are covered by this legislation or 
if some additional authority is required.  
The AUMF provides a less stable foundation for military activities against groups and 
individuals with more tenuous connections to 9/11,
158
 such as AQAP, which was not in existence 
in 2001, or Tehrik-e-Taliban and the Haqqani Network in Pakistan, which only emerged later as 
distinct threats to the U.S.
159
 Various pieces of legislation have been proposed to expand the 
existing AUMF to authorize force against emerging hostile groups and terrorist suspects 
globally.
160
 None of these efforts has yet borne fruit, and the Obama Administration has resisted 
such Congressional re-authorization.
161
 Indeed, the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2012 expressly reaffirms the original scope of the AUMF.
162
  
To date, few facts have emerged specifically linking al-Aulaqi to the attacks of September 11
th
, 
although he apparently knew some of the plotters.
163
 As such, the AUMF provides an uncertain 
foundation for operations in Yemen against individuals such as al-Aulaqi. That said, theories of 
co-belligerency divorced from the law of neutrality
164
 have been advanced to bring groups such 
as AQAP into the AUMF’s folds.165 Co-belligerency historically refers to a relationship among 
states that are engaged cooperatively in an international armed conflict against another state or 
other states. The theory is that an armed conflict between two parties automatically creates a 
state of armed conflict with the opposing state(s)’ allies.166 Although a feature of past IACs, it is 
not difficult to make the conceptual leap from states as co-belligerents to armed groups engaged 
in NIACs as co-belligerents.
167
 As one U.S. district court noted, “‘co-belligerents’ as that term is 
understood under the law of war” means “fully fledged belligerent fighting in association with 
one or more belligerent powers” but does not include organizations that “merely share an 
abstract philosophy or even a common purpose with al Qaeda—there must be an actual 
association in the current conflict with al Qaeda or the Taliban.”168 In the litigation brought by 
al-Aulaqi’s father, the Obama Administration argued that by virtue of making common cause 
with al Qaida, AQAP “is a part of al-Qaeda—or at a minimum an organized, associated force or 
co-belligerent of al-Qaeda in the non-international armed conflict between the U.S. and al-
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Qaeda.”169 Even a notion of NIAC co-belligerency, however, may not be enough to satisfy the 
terms of the AUMF, which ultimately requires a link to 9/11.
170
  
Some would argue that this discussion is moot. It is not settled whether domestic law is even 
necessary to authorize discrete drone attacks like the al-Aulaqi operation. The Obama 
Administration is on record stating that using drones in foreign countries does not require 
congressional approval unless some threshold of force is reached and the lives of U.S. solders are 
at risk. State Department Legal Adviser Harold Hongju Koh testified before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee in connection with the Libya intervention that U.S. involvement, including 
“limited strikes by Predator unmanned aerial vehicles against discrete targets,”171 would not 
constitute participation in “hostilities” as understood by the War Powers Resolution, primarily 
because such operations do not involve the deployment of U.S. armed forces into situations that 
will expose them to exchanges of fire with hostile forces.
172
 With no need for domestic legal 
authority, the al-Aulaqi operation would be evaluated under the international jus ad bellum only. 
This position has been, however, hotly contested within and without the U.S. government.
173
 
3.3. Conclusion: Jus Ad Bellum 
Absent Pakistan’s consent, it is clear that Pakistan’s territorial integrity was violated in the Bin 
Laden operation, although this infraction can be reasonably justified on expanded self-defense 
grounds. Complaints about breaches of the jus ad bellum and Article 2(4) are for Pakistan to 
raise against the U.S.
174
 Although Pakistan has grumbled about the violation of its sovereignty, 
no formal claims have been pursued to date.
175
 Nor are they likely to be forthcoming given the 
lack of actual damage to Pakistani property or interests
176
 and the embarrassment factor 
stemming from the fact that Bin Laden was living in relative comfort in Abbottabad for so long. 
The al-Aulaqi operation does not run afoul of Article 2(4) in light of Yemen’s consent to U.S. 
territorial engagement. That said, the employment of deadly force by a state even absent a 
territorial breach still requires justification. For this, a more expanded form of self-defense is 
required that hinges on a showing of the risk posed by the individual being targeted and his or 
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her amenability to continuous targeting.
177
 All told, relying on self-defense to justify these 
operations requires a number of controversial doctrinal leaps. These include: that a terrorist act 
can constitute an “armed attack;” that in the face of multiple attacks, self-defense applies on a 
continuous basis and not only in the immediate aftermath of any one attack; that self-defense can 
be exercised in the territory of a state that is not acting in collusion with the menace; that self-
defense can be exercised against a single individual in keeping with the principle of necessity; 
and—most importantly—that the law supports a form of anticipatory self-defense that can be 
exercised in the absence of a concrete threat of future attack.  
Even if these international law jus ad bellum arguments prove satisfactory, our inquiry cannot 
end here. Domestic law governing the United States’ war powers also have a say. Although the 
Bin Laden operation falls within the text and purpose of the AUMF, the domestic law foundation 
for the al-Aulaqi killing remains uncertain if al-Aulaqi cannot reasonably be connected to the 
September 11
th
 attacks. In any case, it is difficult to imagine how any claims under domestic law 
would be raised, given the historical reticence of courts to challenge executive decisions about 
exercising the war powers.
178
 This is all assuming that domestic authorization is needed at all. 
Yemen’s consent coupled with the argument that there is no need for domestic authorization for 
discrete drone attacks means that the jus ad bellum may offer little resistance to the al-Aulaqi 
operation.  
If the jus ad bellum authorizes these operations, the jus in bello may further constrain the way in 
which they were implemented. This depends on whether or not IHL applies to these events. If it 
does, the U.S. government cannot exclusively rely on a jus ad bellum framework to justify both 
killings to the exclusion of IHL. With this in mind, the next Section considers the jus in bello 
implications of the two operations after considering the preliminary question of whether this 
body of law applies at all. A subsequent Section discusses the human rights implications under 
either a jus ad bellum or a jus in bello framework bearing in mind that Bin Laden and Al-Aulaqi, 
no matter how odious, still enjoy the protection of human rights law.  
4. Adherence to the Jus in Bello 
The jus ad bellum and jus in bello are often conceived of as applying sequentially, with the latter 
assuming greater salience once a party has resorted to armed force.
179
 With the initiation of the 
jus in bello, however, the jus ad bellum does not recede entirely, as certain aspects (such as the 
principle of proportionality) continue to regulate the use of force once initiated. Moreover, not 
every use of force triggers the applicability of the law of war; it is only when a use of force rises 
to the level of an armed conflict, or has a sufficient nexus to an existing armed conflict, that 
international humanitarian law (IHL) is implicated. Assuming IHL is applicable, however, the 
jus in bello applies to all parties to the armed conflict pursuant to the equal application 
principle,
180
 regardless of the outcome of any jus ad bellum analysis.
181
 The law insists on this 
                                                          
177
 Kretzmer, at p.193. 
178
 See Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (rejecting case by Libyan nationals arguing for the 
illegality of U.S. and British airstrikes on Libya). 
179
 Greenwood 2006, at pp.13, 28.  
180
 Roberts (Adam) 2008.  
Not for Citation or Attribution.  Forthcoming: 14 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2012). 
24 
 
acoustic separation for pragmatic as well as philosophical reasons.
182
 The point is to ensure the 
application of the regulatory jus in bello no matter the cause or legality of the underlying conflict 
so that both the aggressor and the aggressed—as well as the privileged and the unprivileged—are 
bound by the same rules of conduct. The justness of one side’s cause thus does not modify the 
application of the jus in bello between the parties. As such, the question of whether the U.S. was 
entitled to use force vel non in Pakistan and Yemen does not resolve questions about whether 
these particular applications of force were in compliance with the jus in bello.  
It is natural to assume that IHL is the appropriate body of law to resolve questions of this nature, 
given the use of combat power as well as ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and 
elsewhere against elements of al Qaida. However, it is worth considering more closely the a 
priori question of whether IHL applied in Abbottabad, Pakistan, and in Khashef, Yemen, which 
are far from any active battlefield in Afghanistan and even from the border region between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan where a spillover conflict is under way.
183
 If IHL is not applicable, 
then the deaths of Bin Laden and al-Aulaqi could not be characterized as the kind of wartime 
killing sanctioned as a normal—indeed expected—incident of war. The killings would then be 
evaluated under other bodies of law to dramatically different conclusions, as discussed in the 
next Section.  
4.1. Is International Humanitarian Law The Operative Body of Law? 
The law governing armed conflicts—IHL or the law of armed conflict—exhibits a Janus-like 
character. On the one hand, IHL is protective toward certain classes of persons who are 
considered hors de combat—detainees, surrendering combatants, civilians, the shipwrecked, the 
sick, and the wounded. It is unlawful to deliberately target such individuals. At the same time, 
IHL is permissive with respect to other classes of persons, namely active combatants and those 
who engage in hostilities. In contrast to the immunities afforded to protected persons, this latter 
class of persons may be lawfully targeted and killed. In situations in which it applies, IHL thus 
tolerates—and indeed anticipates—many forms of violence that would be unlawful outside of the 
context of war.
184
 In particular, IHL countenances the use of deadly force against the adversary 
as a first resort as compared with peacetime law enforcement scenarios, in which the use of such 
force is allowed only to respond to the exigencies of self-defense, the defense of others, and 
halting a fleeing felon.
185
 In this way, IHL challenges default rules premised on the right to life, 
such as the prohibitions against intentionally killing another human being  
The triggering of IHL is no longer dependent on a declaration of war but rather turns 
pragmatically on empirical facts on the ground, most saliently the presence of an armed conflict 
or situation of occupation. It is widely accepted that an armed conflict is deemed to exist when 
“there is resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
181
 API, supra n.42, Preamble, Clause 5. The U.S. has not ratified API, although in public statements it has accepted 
the binding nature of certain provisions. See The White House - Fact Sheet (2011).  
182
 Moussa 2008. 
183
 Blank 2010, at pp.165, 178. 
184
 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, A/HRC/14/24/Sdd.6 (28 
May 2010), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf 
[hereinafter ‘Alston Report’] at para.47; Blank 2010, at p.15. 
185
 Blank 2010, at p.187.  
Not for Citation or Attribution.  Forthcoming: 14 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2012). 
25 
 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.”186 
The triggering conditions of IHL differ depending on whether the conflict is an international 
(IAC) or non-international armed conflict (NIAC).
187
 Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions indicates that those treaties apply in all cases of “declared war or any other armed 
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties.” The law of 
armed conflict thus would apply wherever the armed forces of at least two states are embattled. 
Indeed, Pictet’s authoritative commentary suggests that those treaties become activated upon a 
very low threshold of inter-state violence,
188
 although this view has been qualified in several 
modern sources to effectively exclude border incidents and other small-scale military 
confrontations between states.
189
 Indeed, the U.S. has argued that military responses undertaken 
pursuant to the inherent right of self-defense as set forth in Article 51 of the Charter do not under 
all circumstances rise to the level of an armed conflict.
190
  
By contrast, a higher threshold exists for establishing the existence of a NIAC that is premised 
on two factors: the scale or intensity of the violence
191
 and the degree of organization of the 
parties.
192
 This higher threshold exists to distinguish such conflicts from a number of situations 
that do not trigger IHL, even if such events provoke a military response by the state. These 
include: small scale operations involving military assets that cannot be deemed to be part of a 
larger armed conflict; situations of “internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and 
sporadic acts of violence, and other acts of a similar nature;”193 and acts of “banditry, 
unorganised and short-lived insurrections, or terrorist activities.”194  
All NIACs are governed by Article 3, which is common to the four Geneva Conventions and 
applies to all conflicts “occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.”195 The 
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 Although not applicable to the events under consideration, Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions 
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International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) commentary offers several criteria for 
triggering common Article 3 (CA3) that turn on whether the party in revolt manifests a sufficient 
degree of organization and hierarchy, the legal government is obliged to have recourse to its 
military forces, the dissident group has popular support, the dispute has been placed on a U.N. 
agenda, and the insurgents exercise some level of control over territory.
196
 The international 
tribunals, in turn, have identified a number of additional factors relevant to evaluating whether 
the intensity of the violence is sufficient to pass through the IHL gateway. These include: the 
number and duration of individual confrontations, the types of weaponry and equipment 
employed, the degree of physical destruction, the number of embattled individuals and 
casualties, the geographical and temporal breadth of clashes, the number of civilians displaced or 
otherwise impacted by fighting, and the involvement of the United Nations (particularly the 
Security Council).
197
 This same case law employs criteria for identifying what constitutes an 
organized armed group. These mirror the characteristics of a formal national army and include: a 
hierarchical structure and rules of engagement, infrastructure to enlist and train recruits, the 
ability to launch military operations, a central authority empowered to negotiate with 
governmental representatives, and a leadership corps capable of being held responsible for the 
group’s acts.198 It has been argued that in light of Article 3’s reference to the “territory” of a 
High Contracting Party, CA3 is meant to govern classic civil wars and does not apply to 
situations in which a state is engaged in an armed conflict with a non-state actor outside its own 
borders and on the territory of another High Contracting Party.
199
 Most commentators agree, 
however, that CA3 provides a floor of protection for all conflicts not of an international 
character.
200
 Notwithstanding these treaty-based triggers for IHL, an emerging customary IHL 
applies across the conflict spectrum and is less dependent on the increasingly artificial 
classification dichotomy
201
 that frames the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols.
202
 
Situations of terrorism and counterterrorism do not constitute “armed conflicts” until a certain 
threshold of intensity, continuity,
203
 group organization,
204
 and military reciprocity is reached.
205
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For example, the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission—an advisory body on constitutional 
matters—determined in 2006 that  
sporadic bombings and other violent acts which terrorist networks perpetrate in 
different places around the globe and the ensuing counter-terrorism measures, 
even if they are occasionally undertaken by military units, cannot be said to 
amount to an ‘armed conflict’ in the sense that they trigger the applicability of 
International Humanitarian Law.
206
 
Some commentators have gone further and resisted the application of IHL to terrorist (and 
criminal) organizations altogether, on the putative ground that to do so would give the members 
of such groups the status and legitimacy of belligerents.
207
 Instead, they have urged the adoption 
of a pure law enforcement model for counterterrorism operations, acknowledging the occasional 
necessity to deploy military might in this context.
208
  
Notwithstanding the distinction often drawn between armed conflicts and acts of terrorism, the 
international tribunals regularly consider acts that would be described as “terroristic” in 
determining whether the required intensity of violence has been reached for the purpose of 
applying IHL.
209
 Indeed, a blanket rejection of the application of IHL to terrorism fails to 
acknowledge the evolution of modern threats to peace and security, the way in which classic 
terrorist attacks can be strategically employed in armed conflict situations, the ease of access to 
advanced and destructive weaponry by a slew of non-state actors, the reach and degree of 
organization of modern terrorist groups, the necessity of resorting to military assets in 
counterterrorism efforts, and the potency of ideology in the absence of territorial ambitions. 
Moreover, conceding that a situation amounts to a NIAC that is governed by IHL does not 
accord any legitimation or privilege to use force to non-state actors, be they rebels, insurgents, 
paramilitaries, drug-traffickers, insurrectionists, pirates, or terrorists. Such fighters remain 
unprivileged belligerents who enjoy neither combat immunity nor prisoner-of-war (POW) status 
and who can be prosecuted domestically for their acts of violence. 
Accepting that IHL does apply in principle to terrorist groups and to conflicts pitting sovereign 
forces against such armed groups, the U.S. has been involved in an armed conflict with al Qaida 
since at least September 11
th
 and the ensuing invasion of Afghanistan on October 7, 2001.
210
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Prior to this point, the U.S. had responded to acts of terrorism attributable to al Qaida (such as 
the first World Trade Center attack in 1993
211
 or even the U.S.S. Cole attack in Yemen in 
2000
212
) primarily within a law enforcement framework.
213
 Since September 2011, however, the 
U.S. has assumed a war footing by enacting an authorization to use military force, deploying 
troops abroad, and establishing military commissions. In so doing, it has eschewed, or at least 
de-emphasized, the criminal law framework. In terms of the customary factors for finding the 
existence of an armed conflict, the level of intensity of violence in Afghanistan and in certain 
spillover regions obviously continues to exceed that necessary to signal the existence of an 
armed conflict. It is clear that al Qaida manifests a sufficient degree of organization to launch 
effective attacks against a range of military objectives and civilian objects. Although not 
necessary to trigger IHL, al Qaida exercises some control over territory in parts of Afghanistan, 
in pockets of the Af-Pak border region, and perhaps even in enclaves within the Arabian 
Peninsula, although territorial dominion is not really its modus operandi. The Security Council 
has described the situation as a threat to international peace and security
214
 and expanded its 
counterterrorism agenda considerably in response, but—as is customary—it has never declared 
the existence of an armed conflict per se.  
As a matter of U.S. law, the conflict originating in Afghanistan has been deemed a NIAC to 
which at least CA3 applies.
215
 In an IAC, military operations can—at a minimum—be carried out 
throughout the sovereign territory of the parties at war.
216
 However, it is unclear how to apply 
this concept to conflicts and to organized armed groups that are not confined to discrete territory. 
Thus, the precise temporal span, geographic boundaries, and spatial reach of the NIAC with al 
Qaida—and concomitantly of IHL—remains uncertain and variable.217 If the killings of Bin 
Laden and al-Aulaqi are to be evaluated according to IHL, it is necessary to develop and defend 
a theory that IHL, and especially its targeting rules, applies to these extra-battlefield events.
218
 
This requires the extension of IHL to areas well beyond the territory where IHL’s predicate 
requirements of intensity and organization have been met, far from those locations where a “hot” 
conflict is being waged, and even beyond areas where terrorist attacks are being planned or 
launched.  
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Several theories exist for applying IHL to both events. Adopting a territorial perspective 
reminiscent of the law governing IACs and the concept of neutrality, one can argue that IHL 
extends to any territory where combat activities between warring parties are under way.
219
 Thus, 
IHL will apply to spillover conflicts that do not respect sovereign boundaries such that “the 
situation in the neighbouring country [is] immediately qualified as a non-international armed 
conflict.”220 At the moment, the conflict against al Qaida proper has leaked through the porous 
borders of Afghanistan and into the FATA regions of Pakistan, although it is unclear to what 
extent the U.S. has troops on the ground there. How much farther IHL extends—to Abbottabad 
(roughly 120 miles from the Afghan border), to the Arabian Peninsula, or even to the U.S. 
itself—remains open to argumentation. In any case, from a territorial or combat activity 
perspective, the contention that the armed conflict with al Qaida extended at a minimum to the 
events in Abbottabad is defensible given the degree of cross-border hostilities already.  
An alternative perspective premised on the identity of the parties would provide that so long as 
IHL has been triggered, it can be deemed to regulate the relationship between adversaries 
wherever they engage each other, regardless of the location of combat activities stricto sensu. By 
this more expansive, and more controversial, account,
221
 IHL essentially follows the warring 
parties wherever they go,
222
 and geographic borders are largely irrelevant to the application of 
IHL rights and duties.
223
 The theater of war is thus non-static and potentially global when dealing 
with violent groups that are motivated by ideology rather than territorial aspirations or political 
ambitions and that spurn international borders. Out-of-theater attacks by and on members of an 
opposition force are thus automatically subject to IHL, regardless of where the predicate conflict 
is being waged geographically.
224
 This approach finds some indirect support in the Geneva 
Conventions, which envisage the protective aspects of IHL extending anywhere that a protected 
person is “in the hands of” a party to an IAC.225 So, in a NIAC, IHL may be deemed to apply any 
time a state uses forcible measures against a non-state fighter, whether on the state’s own 
territory or extraterritorially and regardless of the proximity to hostilities. Thus, IHL would apply 
to any confrontation between U.S. forces and an al Qaida member, be it in the Near East or the 
Eastern Seaboard. A consequence of this approach, however, is an increased threat to civilians 
who are at risk of becoming “collateral damage” even when far from any battlefield.  
In addition to needing a theory of IHL applicability writ large, it is also necessary to show that 
any use of force has a nexus to the predicate armed conflict. Although hostilities within Pakistan 
are part of the pre-existing conflict with al Qaida, it is more difficult to argue that events in the 
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Arabian Peninsula are connected to this particular conflict given the identity of the parties. 
Indeed, central to al-Aulaqi’s father’s lawsuit was that the U.S. was “not at war with Yemen, or 
within it.”226 Satisfying the requirement that operations in Yemen have a nexus to the larger al 
Qaida conflict would depend on the relationship between AQAP and al Qaida proper, an inquiry 
central to satisfying the AUMF as well.
227
 In the alternative, it could be argued that IHL was 
activated by a different, parallel NIAC being waged in Yemen. This conflict pits AQAP against 
the government of Yemen,
228
 with the U.S. occasionally intervening on the side of Yemen, but 
not a full party to the conflict.
229
 The United States’ actions would be governed by IHL under 
these circumstances, although arguably the nexus requirement would dictate that only attacks 
against unprivileged combatants waging war against Yemen (as opposed to against the U.S.) 
would be governed by IHL targeting rules.  
If the United States’ forcible measures in Yemen are not perforce part of the original conflict 
with al Qaida or part of the internal conflict being waged by Yemen, then a separate IHL trigger 
analysis is necessary in order to invoke IHL’s permissive targeting rules for the al-Aulaqi killing. 
This would require the existence of an armed conflict between the U.S. and AQAP itself. In 
terms of the two criteria developed by the ICTY for determining the existence of an armed 
conflict—the existence of organized groups engaged in hostilities of a sufficient intensity—
AQAP is now probably sufficiently coherent to satisfy the first criterion.
230
 However, 
notwithstanding that the U.S. has engaged in a number of drone strikes against terrorist targets in 
Yemen since 2002, it is doubtful whether the required intensity of violence has been reached for 
the hostilities between the U.S. and AQAP on their own to have passed through the IHL 
gateway.
231
 If they have, of course, then there would be domestic law implications in light of the 
War Powers Resolution.
232
  
Assuming that IHL applies to these events because this body of law follows warring parties 
wherever they engage each other with force, the legality of both operations can be established, 
although it still remains necessary to make several crucial doctrinal leaps to do so. As discussed 
in the next section, these leaps turn on the fact that the positive law governing NIACs does not 
                                                          
226
 Al-Aulaqi Complaint, supra n.38, at 2.  
227
 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518.  
228
 Gerges 2011.  
229
 Terrill 2011; Shane, Mazzetti and Worth 2010; Farley 2011.  
230
 Limaj, supra n.192, at para.89 (“This degree [of organization] need not be the same as that required for 
establishing the responsibility of superiors for the acts of their subordinates within the organization”). But see Al-
Awlaki v. Obama, No. 10-cv-01469 (D.D.C. Oct. 7, 2010) (Declaration of Prof. Bernard Haykel), available at 
http://ccrjustice.org/files/Declaration%20of%20Bernard%20Haykel%2010-08-2010.pdf. 
231
 Rona 2003, at p.62.  
232
 See Letter from the President Regarding the Consolidated War Powers Report (Dec. 15, 2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/15/letter-president-regarding-consolidated-war-powers-
report (noting that “consistent with” the War Powers Resolution, the President “has deployed US combat-equipped 
forces to assist in enhancing counterterrorism capabilities of our friends and allies, including special operations and 
other forces for sensitive operations in various locations around the world” (but not mentioning Yemen in the 
unclassified portion of the submission)). 
Not for Citation or Attribution.  Forthcoming: 14 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2012). 
31 
 
fully recognize the concept of combatancy or continuous status-based targeting, which is central 
to the principle of distinction in, and thus the targeting rules of, IHL.
233
  
4.2. Bin Laden and Al-Aulaqi as Lawful Targets 
Combatants engaged in an IAC are considered to be lawful military objectives; as such, they are 
vulnerable to continuous targeting, notwithstanding their conduct or role at the time they are 
engaged. There is no duty to endeavor to capture such individuals, unless they offer their 
surrender. While these permissive rules clearly apply to uniformed members of a state’s armed 
forces, they also apply to officials occupying political positions so long as such individuals play 
a role within the military’s chain of command. Civilians, by contrast, enjoy immunity from direct 
targeting unless and until they directly participate in hostilities. Individuals who offer indirect 
assistance to hostilities—by way of financing, training, or inspiration—retain their immunity 
from direct attack (although they may be prosecuted for their actions). In NIACs, according to 
APII, members of non-state groups employing military force are civilians directly participating 
in hostilities subject to conduct-based targeting rather than combatants subject to status-based 
targeting. States that have engaged in NIACs contest this view. Although the ICRC has accepted 
the notion that individuals may be targeted on the basis of their undertaking a continuous combat 
function within an organized armed groups, there is no consensus on whether the notion of 
combatancy and true status-based targeting exists in NIACs. Because neither Bin Laden nor al-
Aulaqi were directly participating in hostilities at the time they were killed, this debate is central 
to confirming the legality of both operations. 
4.2.1. The Right to Target Enemy Combatants as Military Objectives  
If we are satisfied that IHL applies to these operations at all, the legal analysis goes rather 
smoothly—to a point.234 The principle of distinction—foundational to the law of war—dictates 
that only military objectives may be the target of direct attack.
235
 Military objectives are defined, 
“in so far as objects are concerned” as “those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or 
use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, 
capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military 
advantage.”236 Although enemy combatants are deemed military objectives under IHL, the text is 
unclear as to whether such persons are targetable only if their “destruction, capture or 
neutralization” offers “a definite military advantage.”237 The text implies otherwise by defining 
only military “objects” with reference to these limitations. Even with such a limitation, it can be 
argued that there is target engagement authority for all enemy combatants, because their 
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elimination will inexorably offer a military advantage to the other side.
238
 Indeed, the sole 
objective of hostilities is to “weaken the military forces of the enemy.”239 
The principle of distinction also embodies an “inward-looking responsibility:”240 in exchange for 
the privilege of engaging in hostilities, combatants must distinguish themselves from the civilian 
population in order to signal their targetability.
241
 Combatants are targetable as such by virtue of 
their status rather than their conduct.
242
 Vulnerability to status-based targeting follows them 
wherever they go such that they may be attacked even when not directly engaged in hostilities.
243
  
NIACs, by definition, involve the participation of non-state organized armed groups whose 
members are not accorded the status of combatants per se.
244
 Violations of the principle of 
distinction are often the hallmark of NIACs, in which rebels and insurrectionists strategically use 
the civilian population for cover. In so doing, these fighters exploit the principle of distinction—
and the presumption that their opponents will respect it—to compensate for asymmetries in 
military might. Because these armed groups act independently of any state, their members do not 
have the right to participate in hostilities; nor do they enjoy the privileges and immunities that 
are accorded to members of a state’s armed forces, such as POW status or combat immunity.245 
As such, every act of violence committed by members of such militia in the context of an armed 
conflict is unlawful under the operative domestic law. Participating in an armed conflict without 
the privilege of doing so, however, does not violate humanitarian law per se unless particular 
acts rise to the level of a punishable war crime.
246
  
4.2.2. No Express Duty to Capture Combatants  
As a matter of established IHL doctrine, there is no express duty to capture privileged 
combatants in IACs in lieu of killing them
247
 in the absence of an unambiguous offer of 
unconditional surrender.
248
 Assuming no risk to civilians or civilian objects, the standard 
doctrine dictates that the right to kill combatants is only limited by rules prohibiting perfidy and 
proscribing the use of means and methods that cause maux superflus—“unnecessary suffering 
and superfluous injury.”249 The ability to make combatants the object of attack terminates once a 
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combatant is hors de combat through illness, injury, surrender, capture, or other 
incapacitation.
250
  
This categorical principle—that combatants may be targeted at any time regardless of their 
conduct—developed when troops confronted each other primarily on formal battlefields, far 
from civilian society. Arguably, it applies in full force to the soldier taking his family to the 
cinema, subject to the proportionality and precautionary principles. While doctrinally and 
operationally valid, this principle has rarely been fully tested in such non-theater-of-war contexts 
and is not without controversy. The weak form of the critique would countenance the killing of 
combatants only if there is no reasonable chance of apprehension,
251
 with some allowance 
provided for considerations of force protection.
252
 Thus, this continuous targeting authority may 
be lessened by the principle of military necessity where targets pose no threat to opposing forces 
or where any potential threat can be neutralized through lesser means.
253
 The strong form of this 
revisionism rejects the premise of the “dispensability” of combatants altogether and would 
require the resort to non-lethal force whenever the military objective can be still be 
accomplished, even if military effectiveness, efficiency, or force protection may be 
compromised.
254
 Neither of these critiques, however, finds full expression in standard doctrine. 
All that said, there may be tactical, strategic, pragmatic, and moral reasons—including the 
imperatives of intelligence gathering, public relations, and mercy—for offering to accept the 
surrender of, or capturing, someone posing a threat rather than killing the person outright. 
Although there may be no duty to capture fighters in lieu of killing them, especially in a theater 
of war, the right to kill the adversary is limited by the duty to accept surrender if genuinely 
offered.
255
 Since ancient times,
256
 it has been unlawful to declare ex ante that no quarter shall be 
given,
257
 which includes the issuance of orders to not accept surrender.
258
 Individuals who offer 
to surrender are deemed hors de combat and enjoy immunity from direct attack. As a general 
proposition, however, combatants need not be given an opportunity to surrender before they may 
be engaged. Moreover, a fighting force need not immediately take surrendering fighters into 
custody if it is not safe to do so; however, such individuals may no longer be the object of attack 
unless they resume hostilities.
259
  
4.2.3. Targeting Heads of State, Commanders-in-Chief, and Political Leaders  
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Military officers, as well as the rank and file, operating on a battlefield within a chain of 
command are clear military objectives under IHL. By contrast, a blanket authorization to kill 
political leaders in their capitals, even in a time of armed conflict, may give pause.
260
 Indeed, 
some early international law commentators expressed concern about targeting a sovereign leader 
outside the field of battle.
261
 Many modern commentators still assume that IHL prohibits such 
acts of assassination. For support, they cite Article 23(b) of the 1907 Hague Regulations, which 
proscribes “assassination, proscription, or outlawry of an enemy, or putting a price upon an 
enemy’s head, as well as offering a reward for an enemy ‘dead or alive.’”262 This prohibition, 
however, is now-a-days interpreted to address acts of treachery or perfidy,
263
 and modern IHL 
contains no specific rules
264
 governing the targetability of heads of state or other political 
individuals per se.
265
  
Evaluating the legality of attacks on political, rather than military, leaders thus proceeds 
according to default IHL targeting principles. What ultimately matters is the combat role played 
by the political leader and the manner and circumstances of the operation. A logical application 
of the military objective construct suggests that lawful targets would include any political leader 
(including a Minister of Defense or head of state) within a chain of command who ultimately 
designs or directs military operations as well as the civilian commander-in-chief of a national 
army.
266
 Nonetheless, the rhetoric surrounding scenarios in which the targeting of heads of state 
is contemplated suggests lingering discomfort with this conclusion.
267
 As a result, post hoc attack 
justifications often focus on the less troubling objective of targeting an army’s command and 
control apparatus, which is often difficult to separate from the leader him- or herself. In light of 
the principle of distinction, IHL offers little to justify the killing of political leaders whose roles 
are purely civilian (e.g., a Minister of Education) or who are mere figureheads.  
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4.2.4. Targeting Civilians  
Although the principle of distinction provides that civilians normally enjoy full immunity from 
direct attack, the Protocols provide that civilians can be targeted when and for such time as they 
take a direct part in hostilities (DPH).
268
 These provisions are premised on the idea that civilians 
lose their immunity from attack when they behave like combatants. The DPH doctrine applies in 
both IACs and NIACs.
269
 That said, in today’s armed conflicts, it is most salient in the NIAC 
context in which armed non-state actors are not considered “combatants” even when they do 
battle with governmental authorities or each other. The Protocols thus consider militants linked 
to non-state groups to be civilians who are targetable only when directly participating in 
hostilities.
270
  
The ICRC Interpretive Guidance has set forth a three-part test for determining when an 
individual can be considered to be directly participating in hostilities.
271
 This includes 
consideration of the threshold of harm posed by his or her actions, the causal link between his or 
her actions and potential harm to the opponent, and a nexus to hostilities.
272
 Under this 
framework, it is not enough to contribute to the war-fighting capabilities of an armed group; 
rather, the potential target must be in a position to bring about the harm in question in “one 
causal step.”273 In this way, the DPH construct offers a conduct-based, rather than status-based, 
targeting doctrine.  
Persons posing an immediate danger, such as an insurrectionist sniper or someone laying an 
improvised explosive device (IED), or persons providing direct assistance to such endeavors, 
easily satisfy the three-step DPH test.
274
 The ICRC also accepts that direct participation in 
hostilities includes more than involvement in the physical attack itself; rather, a penumbra of 
preparatory and concluding activities may also qualify so long as the proximate causality 
criterion is met. By contrast, the test would tend to exclude from targetability persons planning a 
belligerent act, recruiting others to participate in such an act, financing violence, formulating 
ideology, or engaging in strategic decision-making about hostile activities.
275
 That said, most 
thinking in this area has been in the nature of the hypothetical, so there is little positive law to 
draw on.  
One jurisprudential source is the Israeli Supreme Court’s opinion in the so-called Targeted 
Killing opinion. Here, the Court was asked to consider the Israeli policy in the context of an 
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occupation and IAC and in the absence of concrete facts.
276
 Rather than reaching a blanket 
conclusion, the Court mandated a case-by-case approach.
277
 Nonetheless, it signaled that it 
would find that “a person who aids the unlawful combatants by general strategic analysis, and 
grants them logistical, general support, including monetary aid” is taking only an indirect part in 
hostilities.
278
 Likewise, an individual engaged in creating or distributing propaganda would not 
be targetable under this view.
279
 The Court considers the person sending others to be taking a 
direct part in hostilities or otherwise planning operations, however, to be lawfully subject to 
direct attack.
280
 This latter conclusion is contestable as it reads “direct” more broadly than would 
the ICRC, which considers the generalized recruitment and training of fighters to be “indirect” 
participation because of a lack of an immediate causal link between the conduct and harm to the 
enemy.
281
 According to the ICRC, in cases of doubt, the potential target must be presumed to be 
a civilian who is immune from direct attack.
282
 The Israeli Supreme Court, by contrast, seems to 
flip this presumption in order to encourage civilians to avoid hostilities in order to protect 
them.
283
 
The treaty language governing the DPH doctrine suggests that civilians are targetable only “for 
such time as” they are directly participating in hostilities.284 This implies that the concept 
governs targeting decisions by state actors based on observing the commission of hostile acts in 
flagrante rather than on exterior manifestations of combatant status, such as a uniform or fixed 
distinctive sign. Armed forces are expected to internalize and employ the test to respond to 
targets of opportunity on the basis of incomplete information in an operational environment. The 
DPH doctrine also provides a criminal defense in the context of a prosecution for the unlawful 
killing of a civilian.
285
 In light of its complexity, the multi-factor DPH test is perhaps more 
amenable to such an ex post application than to ex ante targeting decisions that may require 
virtually instantaneous decision-making. This temporal limitation also raises the specter of a 
revolving door, whereby individuals regain civilian status—which accords protection against 
direct attack—every time they suspend their participation in hostilities. As a result of this textual 
limitation, unprivileged combatants in NIACs are able to evade direct attack more easily than are 
privileged combatants in IACs.
286
  
To respond to the operational realities of NIACs and pressure from states seeking greater 
targeting authority vis-à-vis the members of organized armed groups engaged in NIACs, the 
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ICRC proposed the “continuous combat function” concept, which envisions a notion of quasi-
combatancy in NIACs
287
 and a concomitant function-based (rather than merely conduct-based) 
targeting doctrine.
288
 As the theory goes, when an individual’s participation in hostilities is not 
“spontaneous, sporadic, or unorganized” but rather continuous, he or she may be deemed to be a 
member of an organized armed group belonging to a party to the conflict.
 289
 Individuals who 
take up such a continuous combat function within an organized armed group lose their civilian 
status “for so long as they assume their continuous combat function.”290 As such, so long as such 
individuals carry out a combat function, they may be targeted at any time, even when not directly 
participating in hostilities.
291
 It is only once individuals disengage from the group or cease to 
perform a continuous combat function—however defined—that they regain their civilian status 
and their immunity from direct attack (but not from prosecution for war crimes or their acts of 
belligerency that violate domestic law).
292
  
This concept hinges on what constitutes a “combat function.” Logically, this could apply to those 
individuals who do not participate directly in tactical combat activities in the sense of regularly 
discharging weapons. Thus, it would encompass individuals who organize, equip, provide 
intelligence for, or otherwise direct the hostile activities of subordinates and collaborators on a 
continuous basis.
293
 From this point, it may be difficult to draw the line to exclude those who, on 
a continuous basis, inspire and fund hostile activities in a collective operation; these activities, 
however, are not uniformly accepted as “combat functions.”294 In any case, within the continuous 
combat function framework, it is crucial to develop reliable, objectively verifiable, and current 
intelligence of a potential target’s conduct and role because that individual will be targetable at 
any time or place by virtue of his or her function rather than contemporaneous conduct.
295
 The 
strength of this evidence will be debated ex ante when target lists are drawn up; it may also be 
tested—in accordance with penal burdens of proof—in the event of a criminal prosecution for 
potential breaches of the principle of distinction.  
The ICRC has also proposed additional restraints on the right of a state to target unprivileged 
combatants who are directly participating in hostilities, or who assume a continuous combat 
function in an organized armed group, that derive from the principles of military necessity and 
humanity.
296
 These principles prohibit “the infliction of suffering, injury or destruction not 
actually necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate military purposes.”297 The ICRC notes 
that in certain circumstances—especially in NIACs in which the national force exercises plenary 
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or at least partial control over territory—these limitations may require the capture of, or the 
offering of surrender to, a civilian directly participating in hostilities, rather than his or her 
outright killing.
298
 In this way, the ICRC would accord civilians who are directly participating or 
assuming a continuous combat function in hostilities a measure of protection that is not accorded 
to privileged combatants in an IAC. This position finds resonance in the Israeli decision, which 
held that a civilian taking a direct part in hostilities “cannot be attacked at such time as he is 
doing so, if a less harmful means can be employed.”299 The Court traced this sequential least-
injurious-means approach to a general principle of proportionality found in Israeli domestic law 
(and perhaps also to the state of occupation), rather than to IHL stricto sensu.
300
  
The ICRC’s guidance has not been universally accepted. In particular, the ICRC has been 
criticized by some governments and academics for aligning members of organized armed forces 
closer to civilians than to regular state armed forces and for unreasonably circumscribing the 
targetability of those who join organized armed groups.
301
 In particular, the continuous combat 
function construct disallows the direct targeting of individuals who undertake many non-combat 
support functions that are regularly performed by uniformed service members and that are 
integral to a fighting force, but that are not combat functions per se.
302
 The counter-argument is 
that civilians who join an organized armed group unaffiliated with a state should be equally as 
targetable as privileged combatants engaged in an IAC, regardless of their assumption of a 
combat versus support function. Indeed, there is state practice in NIACs asserting a continuous 
targeting authority that does not hinge upon a showing that the individual was participating in 
hostilities or even engaged in a continuous combat function but rather that the target was a 
member of an organized armed group that is engaged in hostilities.
303
 In addition, the continuous 
combat function concept unrealistically assumes that militants occupy a permanent functional 
role in any fighting force, which may not be the case with non-state groups whose members may 
occupy roles that are more fluid than in a national army.
304
 There is also objection to the 
purported obligation to employ least injurious means in NIACs on the ground that militants 
should be targetable regardless of whether capture is possible, as is the rule in IACs. This latter 
criticism hinges in part on the fact that it is difficult to come up with defensible reasons to limit 
the proposed sequential approach to NIACs and to unprivileged belligerents.
305
 Such limitations, 
whether applicable in NIACs or IACs, would constrain the use of lethal force in ways that the 
dissenters are unwilling to countenance. These perceived problems with the ICRC’s guidance 
gave rise to intense controversy and caused several of the experts involved to recuse themselves 
from mention in the final report.
306
  
4.2.5. The Events in Question 
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Turning to the events at issue, al Qaida has manifested an enduring intention to engage in 
hostilities against the U.S. and other states. Determining the targetability of particular members 
of al Qaida within the IHL targeting schema and the ICRC’s DPH guidance nonetheless raises a 
number of ambiguities. Al Qaida has been characterized as a loosely-organized and 
internationally-dispersed organization whose subunits share an overarching ideology, but enjoy a 
high degree of autonomy in terms of tactics and objectives.
307
 Perhaps by design, individual units 
may not meet the criteria employed in IHL for an organized armed group, which assume such 
groups are objectively identifiable and sufficiently organized to launch military operations of a 
particular intensity and duration. It is unclear to what extent al Qaida cells operating outside of 
Afghanistan take orders from any central authority in the sense of their being a “terrorism 
franchise.”308 
Not surprising, the U.S. took the position that both individuals were military objectives, equated 
to enemy commanders in the field. In statements following their deaths, U.S. spokespersons 
stressed the two men’s continuing or growing (in the case of al-Aulaqi) operational roles.309 If al 
Qaida satisfies the organized armed group criterion, Bin Laden—separate and apart from his 
command and control apparatus—as the head of an organized armed group involved in the 
conflict can be conceptualized as a lawful military objective. Of course, it is fair to query 
whether he still exercised any operational leadership at the time he was killed. In the alternative, 
his role may have become purely symbolic or ceremonial, especially given the apparent 
decentralization and compartmentalization of al Qaida and Bin Laden’s relative isolation in 
Pakistan.
310
 Likewise, al-Aulaqi has been described as a propagandist and media personality 
rather than a tactician. An argument could thus be made that both Bin Laden and al-Aulaqi were 
akin to political leaders, rather than military personnel, which would place them in the grey area 
surrounding the right to target civilian leaders. This may be a distinction without a difference 
when it comes to terrorist groups. Although “many of the world’s most sophisticated non-state 
warring parties have distinct political and military wings,”311 in terrorist groups, there may be 
little division between the political and military leadership.
312
  
None of the reports of the incidents reveals evidence that either individual was directly 
participating in hostilities at the time he was killed, hence the importance of the continuing 
combat function concept for legalizing both attacks. That concept provides cover, however, only 
if both men in fact occupied combat roles on a continuous basis, which might be more difficult to 
prove if the two men were ideologues or financiers. These distinctions lose their force if 
continuous targeting authority exists vis-à-vis members of organized armed groups in NIACs on 
the basis of mere membership alone, as contended by many states. By this approach, both men 
were fully assimilated to combatants engaged in an IAC for targeting purposes who could be 
engaged at any time based on their status rather than their conduct or functional role without 
running afoul of the principle of distinction.  
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In terms of the United States’ adherence to IHL proportionality in Operation Neptune Spear, 
collateral damage was minimal, especially when assessed against the high value of the target.
313
 
The raid resulted in the death or injury of two colorable civilians (excluding the courier and Bin 
Laden’s son). This is an impressive result in light of the fact that upwards of thirty people, 
including potentially thirteen children, were thought to have been present or residing in the 
compound.
314
 Apparently, there was some dissension among President Obama’s inner national 
security circle about how to respond to the intelligence of Bin Laden’s whereabouts. It has been 
reported that President Obama ultimately “vetoed a plan to obliterate the compound with an 
airstrike.”315 One concern with this plan was that Bin Laden’s presence in the compound may 
have been impossible to verify. Given Bin Laden’s residence in a civilian neighborhood, the risk 
of collateral damage would also no doubt have been higher with an air strike than a ground raid. 
That said, IHL tolerates a higher degree of collateral damage with high value targets.  
Because accomplished face-to-face, the Bin Laden operation does not raise many of the concerns 
inherent to the use of RPVs as in the al-Aulaqi operation.
316
 The use of drones in modern warfare 
has raised discomfort on a number of grounds, including the lack of reciprocity of risk, the 
concern that their use stems from an excessive preoccupation with force protection,
317
 the 
inability to precisely calibrate the level of force employed, and the fact that their use precludes 
the ability to capture suspects or to accept their surrender
318
 (which, of course, is true of all aerial 
attacks).
319
 From a jus in bello perspective, there is nothing about using continuous surveillance 
and precision-guided missiles per se that runs afoul of the principle of proportionality so long as 
the object of the attack is a lawful one and precautions against incidental harm are implemented. 
Indeed, we might ultimately prefer a decapitation strike in which key individuals are targeted 
with precision, after detailed pattern-of-life analyses, rather than eliminated in large-scale clashes 
between armed forces or following airstrikes using heavier munitions.
320
 In terms of collateral 
damage, there appears to have been no prior knowledge that Samir Khan, the other American 
citizen killed, was in the vehicle with al-Aulaqi that day.
321
 Without an expressly operational 
role, it is unclear if Khan himself would have been considered a military objective. According to 
reports, he too played a central role in al Qaida’s propaganda machine, but whether such 
machinery is a military objective remains controversial.
322
 We have little insight into the 
identities of the other individuals in the car that day, although one of the dead may have been 
Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri, an alleged bomb maker.
323
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Even if Bin Laden is a legitimate military objective, his death could still constitute a war crime if 
he was hors de combat (i.e., if he was surrendering, sick, or injured so as to pose no further 
threat) or killed treacherously or perfidiously (i.e., if he could have reasonably thought the 
SEALs were civilians). Accounts do not bear these scenarios out,
324
 but we may never know for 
sure whether a genuine surrender was offered. Even if the attack was lawfully executed by the 
immediate actors, a war crime could have been committed by their superiors in the event that an 
order to take no prisoners was issued. The Administration insists, however, that contingency 
plans were in place for the team to accept Bin Laden’s surrender if it was offered, implying that 
there was no order to take no quarter. A spokesperson stated: 
The team had the authority to kill Osama bin Laden unless he offered to 
surrender; in which case the team was required to accept his surrender if the team 
could do so safely. … Consistent with the laws of war, bin Laden’s surrender 
would have been accepted if feasible.
 325 
Even if surrender was offered, it may not have been safe for the SEAL team to immediately take 
Bin Laden into custody given the presence of weapons and other threatening individuals in the 
compound. That said, so long as he did not take up arms or attempt to flee, Bin Laden had he 
surrendered would have remained immune from direct attack until the hostile situation was 
defused. One final lingering objection to the way in which the operation was implemented 
concerns the two shots fired at Bin Laden. This invokes the controversial phenomenon of 
“double-tapping,” which involves using a second shot to “finish off” a combatant who has been 
fully disabled by a first shot.
326
  
In evaluating the legality of these operations, it is not enough to examine the status of the target; 
the status of the attacker may also be relevant. Navy SEALs—who would be deemed privileged 
combatants in an IAC—carried out the Bin Laden operation. By contrast, the drone program in 
Yemen is run largely by civilians in the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, thus signaling the 
evolution of the intelligence agency into a paramilitary force.
327
 This actuality raises the question 
of whether these state actors are entitled to engage in hostilities under IHL. If members of the 
CIA involved in such an operation in an IAC were to be captured or extradited by the territorial 
or nationality state, they may not be entitled to assert the defense of combatant immunity, even if 
the operation were conducted lawfully under the law of war.
328
 According to the Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: 
[I]ntelligence personnel do not have immunity from prosecution under domestic 
law for their conduct. They are thus unlike State armed forces which would 
generally be immune from prosecution for the same conduct (assuming they 
complied with IHL requirements). Thus, CIA personnel could be prosecuted for 
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murder under the domestic law of any country in which they conduct targeted 
drone killings, and could also be prosecuted for violations of applicable US 
law.
329
 
The ICRC’s study of customary IHL takes a pragmatic approach to the question of the 
involvement of law enforcement and intelligence personnel in hostilities: “[w]hen these units 
take part in hostilities and fulfil the criteria of armed forces, they are considered combatants.”330 
The incorporation of armed law enforcement agencies into the armed forces is normally 
accomplished through a formal legislative act.
331
 Likewise, the ICC Statute reflects the diversity 
of state actors who may engage in hostilities by discussing armed conflicts involving 
“governmental authorities” rather than designating such participants as members of the “armed 
forces” stricto sensu.332  
As a matter of established doctrine, combat immunity is a feature of the law governing IACs that 
protects privileged combatants from prosecution for lawful acts of war by another state. It does 
not exist as a formal matter in the law governing NIACs, where rebels and other non-state 
fighters are not privileged to use force and can be prosecuted for any acts of violence they 
commit or even for mere participation in an insurrection if domestic law penalizes such 
conduct.
333
 This asymmetry stems from the fact that NIACs historically occurred on the territory 
of a single state, as in the classic civil war scenario, such that there was little risk that the state’s 
own armed forces would be prosecuted for lawful acts of war. It bears consideration, however, of 
whether a doctrine of combat immunity should be developed to protect privileged combatants 
from being prosecuted for lawful acts of war committed in an extraterritorial NIAC. As it stands, 
international law would not constrain either Pakistan or Yemen from prosecuting a U.S. soldier 
or member of the CIA for committing a violent act on their territory.  
4.3. Conclusion: Jus in Bello  
The contention that both Bin Laden and al-Aulaqi were lawful military objectives subject to 
continuous targeting authority on the basis of their status, as opposed to their activities at the 
moment of their deathes, emerges as a central justification for both operations. A priori, this 
position requires a theory for the applicability of IHL to the events in question. If IHL follows 
our protagonists wherever engage with each other—as opposed to applying only to territory 
where combat activities regularly occur—then IHL offers support for these operations. Legal 
certainty in the Yemen context requires a theory for why the conflict with AQAP is either part of 
the conflict against al Qaida writ large or triggers IHL on its own or in connection with some 
other armed conflict being waged on the Arabian Peninsula. The conclusion of legality also 
requires, at a minimum, acceptance of the ICRC’s continuous combat function concept, with a 
rejection of the least-injurious-means limitation that the ICRC proposes on such targeting 
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authority. If the two men did not occupy a combat role, however, then a more robust targeting 
authority is required premised exclusively on their membership in an organized armed group.  
All this analysis presumes the applicability of IHL. Outside of this framework, these events 
become more suspect given non-derogable prohibitions against summary execution
334
 set forth in 
many human rights instruments, not to mention prohibitions against murder and assassination 
under relevant domestic law and the constitutional imperative of due process. The applicability 
of these latter bodies of law depends, in part, on complex and contested questions of choice of 
law and extraterritoriality. Indeed, even if IHL is applicable, it is not entirely settled that these 
other legal regimes do not also apply in parallel. There are conflicting views on whether IHL as 
the lex specialis, within the meaning of the adage lex specialis derogate legi generali (“the 
special rule overrides the general law”),335 fully displaces or merely qualifies other otherwise 
applicable bodies of international law, such as human rights law, in a state of armed conflict. The 
next Section explores this choice of law dilemma.  
5. Alternative Bodies of Law 
All of the foregoing analysis assumes that IHL is the right framework from which to evaluate the 
two operations. If IHL is not applicable at all, then other bodies of law rise to the fore, including 
U.S. domestic law and international human rights law (IHRL) (presuming their extraterritorial 
application) alongside the lex fori, Pakistani and Yemeni domestic law.
336
 Even if IHL has been 
triggered and regulates these events, IHRL may still apply in parallel as a source of rules to fill 
gaps in IHL, to interpret undefined or imprecise concepts in IHL, or even to mitigate certain 
more permissive aspects of IHL.
337
 IHRL may be particularly relevant in regulating the conduct 
of states engaged in NIACs, where rules are less developed as compared to IACs. Likewise, 
elements of the relevant domestic law will continue to regulate aspects of these events in parallel 
with these bodies of international law. This Section will focus primarily on the international 
choice of law question, but will identify points of intersection and tension between international 
and domestic law. Taken as a whole, this inquiry reveals the existence of overlapping regimes 
without clear rules on resolving conflicts of law that arise. 
5.1. International Human Rights 
Starting with human rights law, even if IHL does apply to these events, it is not entirely clear that 
IHRL is silent.
338
 This query invokes the vexing issue in contemporary international law of how 
to resolve the normative tensions that exist at the intersection of these two bodies of law. Many 
theories have been espoused in the literature and jurisprudence to resolve potential conflicts of 
law that may arise at this interface. The first theory is one of lex specialis, which comes in a 
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strong and a weak form.
339
 The strong form envisions a total displacement of IHRL upon the 
commencement of armed conflict.
340
 By this view, humanitarian law and human rights law are 
self-contained, mutually exclusive regimes. Where IHL does not speak to a situation, actors are 
free to choose a course of action, unfettered by legal rules drawn from elsewhere.
341
 Gaps in the 
law are deemed purposeful in a sense such that they should not be filled from other sources.  
The weak form of the lex specialis theory does not envision the total displacement of 
international human rights norms in armed conflict situations except where the rules of IHL and 
IHRL are in direct contradiction. Where the applicable rules are not directly opposed to each 
other, this approach would dictate that the two bodies of law should be harmonized
342
 through 
interpretive techniques
343
 and formal declarations of derogation.
344
 As such, where there are gaps 
in IHL, there may be other rules—including human rights norms and domestic law—that are 
applicable.
345
 Human rights law can thus be employed as an interpretive aid to add content to 
undefined terms in IHL, such as “judicial guarantees” and “humane treatment,” or to expound 
upon treaty obligations, as in situations of occupation when the occupying state exercises plenary 
power over territory.
346
 In a recent submission to the Human Rights Committee, the U.S. 
acknowledged that IHL and IHRL are “complementary and mutually reinforcing.”347 This is a 
departure from prior statements that adopted a more robust lex specialis position.
348
 
While many adherents to a lex specialis approach consider human rights to be an invasive 
species vis-à-vis IHL, it cannot be gainsaid that positive IHL invites in these very norms. Thus, 
many IHL treaties create space for a consideration of, or even interlineations with, human rights 
norms and concerns. The Martens Clause is the precursor to this phenomenon,
349
 and Articles 72 
and 75 of API are more modern and fulsome manifestations of this tendency. These textual 
portals go far toward debunking the lex specialis maximus approach to the humanitarian 
law/human rights interface. By the same measure, there are IHRL treaties that specifically make 
allowances for situations governed by IHL. The European Convention on Human Rights, for 
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example, specifically exempts from censure “deaths resulting from lawful acts of war.”350 This 
formulation necessarily imports elements of IHL into the human rights analysis such that in a 
situation of armed conflict, IHL defines what constitutes an “extrajudicial” killing. 
A third approach to managing this interface rejects the idea of lex specialis and of a hierarchy of 
rules altogether. Instead, it presumes that the most appropriate rule or body of law should be 
applied in any particular scenario to promote “systemic integration.”351 This may result in a 
sliding scale between the two bodies of law depending on the circumstances. So, activities on the 
battlefield or in an active theater of hostilities may be governed almost exclusively by IHL, but 
human rights law may have more to say vis-à-vis detention practices in light of its detailed rules 
on conditions of confinement and judicial protections. Thus, the applicability of IHL is not 
necessarily binary, in the sense that the corpus of IHL either applies in its entirety to an incident, 
territory, or individual, or not at all. Finally, one can envision a reverse lex specialis 
prioritization, where by international human rights norms temper elements of classic IHL. This 
may be due to the fact that many human rights norms constitute later in time legal 
pronouncements.
352
 Or, it may be by virtue of human rights rules’ strong normative force.353 This 
latter approach might demand the additive application of applicable rules to ensure maximum 
protection to the individual.
354
  
Most courts and commentators have adopted a harmonizing approach to this question. The ICJ, 
for example, stated that IHL as the lex specialis would determine whether a particular killing was 
“arbitrary”: 
The test of what is arbitrary deprivation of life, however, … falls to be determined 
by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict is 
which designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a particular 
loss of life … is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to 
Article 6 of the Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights], can only be decided by 
reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms 
of the Covenant itself.
355
 
Even the former Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killing, Summary on Arbitrary Executions 
conceded that targeted killing can be lawful in the context of IHL: “[A]though in most 
circumstances targeted killings violate the right to life, in the exceptional circumstances of armed 
conflict, they may be legal.”356 This conclusion reveals the importance of the a priori question of 
the applicability of IHL and the existence of a predicate armed conflict.  
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Resolving the conflict of law question is not the only impediment to applying human rights 
norms to these events. In many of today’s conflict situations—especially transnational conflicts 
involving the U.S.—theories for the pertinence of human rights law also presume the 
extraterritorial application of states’ IHR obligations.357 This remains contested, especially by the 
U.S., which until recently could have been described as a persistent objector to the proposition 
that such extraterritorial obligations exist. This position, however, is increasingly out of step with 
the caselaw.
358
 At a minimum, the current state of the law would dictate that human rights norms 
apply wherever a state exercises de facto control over territory (including in the sense of 
undertaking governmental functions)
359
 or individuals.
360
 An argument could be made that Bin 
Laden was in—or could easily have been brought into—the effective control of the SEAL team. 
It is more difficult to argue that al-Aulaqi was within the effective control of the U.S. since he 
was killed from a distance, without actually being physically in the hands of state agents.
361
 If 
this distinction is valid, state responsibility under IHRL could turn on the way in which an 
individual was killed, rather than the question of whether state exercised control over the 
individual’s life. Any requirement of physical custody for showing effective control, however, 
offers a perverse loophole for states to avoid their human rights violations by operating 
remotely.
362
  
Turning to the content of IHRL, most human rights instruments contain a broad articulation of 
the right to life,
363
 although some treaties qualify the formulation of this right by prohibiting only 
the “arbitrary” deprivation of life.364 Furthermore, this right is considered non-derogable except 
when a sovereign employs deadly force in situations of self-defense, to otherwise protect life, or 
to prevent the escape of a dangerous suspect.
365
 State actors can thus employ deadly force in law 
enforcement actions only when the target poses an immediate danger to the arresting officer.
366
 
The European Court of Human Rights has mandated a strict test of necessity be employed to 
determine if lethal force is warranted; there must also be proportionality between the state’s 
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response and the perceived threat, and alternatives to lethal force must be considered.
367
 
Generally, law enforcement personnel are expected to offer warnings and attempt apprehension 
before resorting to deadly force.
368
  
Theoretically, the right to life adheres even in situations of armed conflict. Indeed, the former 
U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions concluded that 
“extrajudicial executions can never be justified under any circumstances, not even in time of 
war.”369 Accordingly, the Rapporteur decried the first airstrike in Yemen in 2002 as “a clear case 
of extrajudicial killing.”370 Nonetheless, assuming the applicability of both bodies of law, the 
human right regime may cede regulatory authority to the jus in bello, which—as discussed 
above—can be interpreted to characterize the two killings as lawful wartime killings of the 
enemy.
371
 
This analysis reaches a contrary conclusion if IHL is removed from consideration. If there is no 
armed conflict, and the jus ad bellum self-defense justification governs the decision to use 
military force, international human rights law continues to protect individuals from arbitrary 
deprivations of life. The lex specialis debate is less conceptually salient in the literature when 
only the jus ad bellum is applicable. In the operations under consideration, the degree of force 
employed exceeded that which would be acceptable under a law enforcement framework 
(although the Bin Laden raid is a closer call in light of the inherent dangerousness of the 
situation that day
372
). It is unclear, however, if jus-ad-bellum operations targeting a single 
dangerous individual should be analyzed as law enforcement operations or if some other 
harmonization of IHR and the jus ad bellum is necessary. Certainly there is some role for IHRL 
to play here, particularly to protect civilians from harm in light in the absence of a concept of 
collateral damage outside of situations of armed conflict.  
There are multiple theories for how the law governing the use of force and human rights law 
interact. In particular, there will be situations in counterterrorism operations, such as the events 
in question, when the jus ad bellum, the jus in bello, and IHRL simply cannot be perfectly 
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harmonized because the two bodies of law permit forms of action or impose obligations and 
restraints that are inherently incompatible. In such situations, it comes down to a pragmatic 
policy choice by the state as to which body of rules to follow. This choice is, of course, subject to 
the recognition that the state will have to accept any consequences, even if just reputational, for 
having breached an equally applicable legal obligation. 
5.2. Domestic Law  
As this article is primarily focused on international law, a full treatment of the domestic law 
implications of these operations is beyond its scope. It is worth simply highlighting several 
considerations that would be relevant to synchronizing the jus in bello considerations discussed 
above with U.S. statutory and constitutional law and with the lex fori.  
5.2.1. U.S. Domestic Law  
There are several elements of U.S. domestic law that might govern the events in question. Most 
saliently, the U.S. has banned assassination as a matter of national policy through an iterative 
series of executive orders, the last of which remains extant.
373
 In the wake of alleged peacetime 
assassination plots against foreign leaders in the 1960s and 1970s,
374
 U.S. Presidents Gerald 
Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan issued executive orders (E.O. 11905 (1976),
375
 E.O. 
12036 (1978),
376
 and E.O. 12333 (1981),
377
 respectively) banning assassination without 
Presidential approval. E.O. 12333, for example, provides: 
No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall 
engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination. 
Over the years, legislation has been introduced to fortify
378
 or limit
379
 the express prohibition 
against assassination in these decrees, but nothing has been enacted to date. Indeed, the 
Executive Order was likely passed originally in order to head off a legislative ban.  
In an exercise of concerted ambiguity, none of the E.O.s actually defines assassination, although 
“the context in which [the first order] was promulgated suggests that it was understood to apply 
to circumstances similar to those that recently had been the subject of investigation.”380 
Colloquially, the concept of assassination—which carries a distinctly negative connotation—
encompasses the intentional and premeditated killing of a particular individual (often a 
government official, influential civilian, or other prominent figure) for political purposes. To 
many, it embodies a notion of treachery
381
 as in death by poison cigar or exploding umbrella.
382
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This element of a betrayal of trust is not, however, inherent to the concept. The full reach of the 
Order has been the subject of speculation given recent events, such as with respect to the 
bombing of Libya in 1986
383
 or calls to eliminate Saddam Hussein in the first Gulf War.
384
  
For our purposes, the ban on assassination must be reconciled with the use of lethal force in the 
context of armed conflicts, counterinsurgency operations, and counterterrorism measures taken 
in self-defense. In its broadest terms, the Executive Order could be interpreted to mean that the 
U.S. cannot kill a pre-selected individual under any circumstances. In the alternative, the ban 
may remain applicable unless there is a valid authorization to use force emanating from 
Congress.
385
 Another interpretation would exclude the Order’s applicability in wartime 
altogether on the basis of the argument that it applies to intelligence rather than military 
activities.
386
 To this end, the U.S. executive orders have been interpreted to apply only in 
peacetime or, at a minimum, to embody implicit exceptions in conventional military, 
counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism operations.
387
 Col. W. Hays Parks, when he was Special 
Assistant for Law of War Matters to the Judge Advocate General of the Army, concluded that 
clandestine, low visibility or overt use of military force against legitimate targets 
in time of war, or against similar targets in time of peace where such individuals 
or groups pose an immediate threat to US citizens or the national security of the 
US, as determined by competent authority, does not constitute assassination or 
conspiracy to engage in assassination, and would not be prohibited by the 
proscription in EO 12333 or by international law.
388
 
The classic historical example cited is the downing of the aircraft carrying Japanese Admiral 
Yamamoto Isoroku in 1943 far from any battlefield.
389
 By this reasoning, the killing of the head 
of an organized armed force, even in a NIAC, would be governed by IHL as a form of lex 
specialis rather than the assassination ban. Even if some ban on assassination exists in IHL, it 
likely covers the killing of senior officers by treachery or trickery, which would not be the case 
where uniformed SEALs and remote attacks are involved.  
Although outside the scope of this study, there is no question that other foundational elements of 
domestic law, such as the 4
th
 and 5
th
 Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, may speak to these 
events. Indeed, it is also worth considering whether these protections may be more robust vis-à-
vis al-Aulaqi as a U.S. citizen, even though the 5
th
 Amendment clearly applies to all persons and 
not just citizens. There is early precedent suggesting that citizenship might be relevant to 
determining the sliding scale between the law of war and domestic law (at least when it comes to 
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the reach of military jurisdiction), but the issue of the rights of non-citizens was not squarely 
presented.
390
 A devotion to universal human rights principles, however, might counsel against 
asserting any distinction between the two operations based on citizenship alone. The strength of 
constitutional protections may also turn on whether these events are perceived to have occurred 
on a battlefield. Indeed, in Hamdi, the Supreme Court specifically distinguished between actions 
“on the battlefield” against a U.S. citizen and the detention of that citizen, which “meddles little, 
if at all, in the strategy or conduct of war.”391 At the same time, prudential doctrines—such as the 
political question doctrine—may intrude to neutralize any potential constitutional claims arising 
out of these events.
392
 All this said, assuming the parallel applicability of IHL, a robust lex 
specialis conclusion could theoretically override any limitations imposed by the 5
th
 Amendment 
due process clause.
393
 Absent a strong theory of lex specialis, the due process clause may 
mitigate the more permissive aspects of IHL, particularly outside of a “hot” conflict situation, 
which will be discussed in greater detail in the next Section.  
5.2.2. Pakistani and Yemeni Law 
It must not be forgotten that the law of the territorial state continues to apply to the actions of 
foreign states within its borders. Standard penal prohibitions against murder and mayhem would 
govern the events in question absent displacement by the jus ad bellum or IHL as the lex 
specialis. One can imagine a counter-factual scenario in which one of the SEALs was captured 
by Pakistani forces and prosecuted for murder. That defendant would no doubt invoke combat 
immunity as a defense (along with individual self-defense perhaps). Pakistani jurists, however, 
would be under no international law obligation to recognize the defense in this NIAC context, 
especially given that the U.S. was employing forcible measures without Pakistan’s consent. 
Because it was launched remotely, the Al-Aulaqi operation would not likely yield a prosecutable 
defendant, unless the base itself was located in Yemen. In any case, these contingencies are all 
extremely unlikely, given the state of the United States’ relations with these two countries and 
the high profile nature of the targets.
394
  
5.3. Conclusion: Domestic Law 
It is, of course, unlikely that the U.S. would ever actually apply the assassination ban to the 
events in question, even if it were applicable. In any case, there is an authoritative interpretation 
of the Executive Order that suggests it is meant to govern peacetime killings of public figures 
rather than wartime killings of military objectives. Pakistani and Yemeni law continue to apply 
to these events. Even though the operations might be lawful under international law, there would 
be no bar to Pakistan or Yemen prosecuting one of the actors involved if custody could be 
obtained absent a doctrine of combatant immunity in the law governing NIACs.  
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6. Locating a Duty to Capture In International or Domestic Law 
These operations have given rise to the claim that the U.S. was under a duty to endeavor to 
capture Bin Laden and/or al-Aulaqi in lieu of killing them outright, especially given that neither 
was confronted on a “hot” battlefield. There are a number of places in this international law 
schema where one might locate such an obligation, especially given the fuzziness of the 
interfaces between the relevant legal regimes and the potential for normative overlap. Within the 
jus ad bellum, the proportionality requirement inherent to the customary doctrine of self-defense 
may demand capture in certain circumstances when a state is addressing a threat posed by a 
single individual rather than by a sovereign entity, military installment, hostile force, or combat 
asset. This may especially be the case when the individual is found outside of an established 
battlefield. Similarly, the necessity requirement might place limits on the robustness of defensive 
action where capture is feasible. Relevant considerations may include the strength of the 
relationship between the targeting state and the territorial state, the dependability of the territorial 
state as a partner in effectuating capture, and the sophistication of the intelligence, technology, 
and military assets that the targeting state has at its disposal (bearing in mind the debate over 
whether international law creates relative obligations among nations depending on their level of 
development). Indeed it could be argued that where the territorial state has consented to foreign 
intervention, there is a greater duty to attempt to capture rather than kill an individual, in light of 
the potential to gain cooperation and assistance from local law enforcement officials. At the 
same time, a state such as Yemen may be more willing to allow a remotely-piloted vehicle to 
enter its airspace than troops on its territory. Alternatively, it could be argued that where the 
exercise of self-defense is reactive (as in following a completed armed attack) or strictly 
preventative (as in the face of an inchoate threat, rather than imminent attack), international 
law—through the principles of necessity or proportionality—imposes heightened restrictions on 
the lethality of any defensive response. 
Within the jus in bello and the rules governing NIACs, the ICRC’s theory of least restrictive 
means might not countenance resort to lethal force unless the target is engaged while directly 
participating in hostilities, even if the individual is a member of an organized armed group who 
has assumed a continuous combat function in the group. In addition, the right to use lethal force 
might be limited by principles of military necessity, proportionality, or humanity in out-of-
theater situations. Thus, while a state may be entitled to directly target a non-state fighter who is 
in the process of attacking national forces, armed forces may be limited to less injurious means 
when confronting an unarmed fighter who is not posing an immediate threat.  
Human rights norms—and particularly the more robust version of proportionality governing law 
enforcement scenarios—might temper the jus ad bellum or IHL’s targeting rules when an 
operation is undertaken outside of actual combat. In particular, the principle of military necessity 
might dictate the use of less than lethal means in such a scenario because it is difficult to argue 
that the killing (as opposed to capture) of fighters is “indispensable” under the circumstances.395 
Turning to domestic law, while the assassination ban is likely inapposite here, it remains to be 
fully explored whether the 5
th
 Amendment due process clause, a fortiori with respect to al-
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Aulaqi, might impose any limits along the lines of the Israeli Supreme Court’s conclusion in the 
Targeted Killing opinion.
396
 This may be especially true when chargeable crimes—such as 
terrorism or treason—exist in domestic law. In short, there are places within this journey to 
legality where an authoritative decision maker might impose heightened obligations on a state 
actor to endeavor to capture rather than kill an individual posing a threat to the nation.  
The argument that members of such groups may be targeted wherever they are may be palatable 
when dealing with embattled foreign lands. It may be more problematic when applied to 
individuals found on U.S. soil—a scenario not presented by the two operations under 
consideration but logically foreseeable. Any arguments employed to justify unrestricted targeting 
of enemy combatants abroad with lethal force could be domesticated with little effort. And yet, 
the application of a pure law-of-war framework to alleged members of al Qaida apprehended in 
the U.S. has been controversial and remains the subject of litigation. In the face of legal 
challenge, the executive branch has eventually foregone detention and charged such individuals 
in Article III courts with violations of Title 18 of the U.S. Code.
397
 As a result, whether or not the 
U.S. Constitution or any other source of law places limits on the application of IHL to 
exclusively domestic events in the absence of an armed conflict on U.S. territory has never been 
fully tested.  
7. Conclusion 
This epistemological journey has revealed multiple bodies of law under intense pressure from 
exogenous forces of globalization and the metastasis of transnational terrorism. The relevant law 
is unclear, indeterminate, or in flux at many key junctures along the way to a finding of legality 
vis-à-vis the two events in question. Thus, there is no definitive answer to the question of 
whether the doctrine of self-defense provides a justification for both the incursion into Pakistani 
sovereign territory and the use of deadly force against an individual posing an expected but 
inchoate threat to a nation. Likewise, assuming a self-defense rationale alone is insufficient or 
unavailable to justify both operations, IHL offers another source of potential authority. This, 
however, assumes that IHL follows militants wherever they may go, even if they journey far 
from the combat activities that activated this body of law in the first place. Nor is it certain that 
there is continuous targeting authority over individuals whom the core IHL treaties would 
classify as civilians, targetable only when directly participating in hostilities. The claim to 
legality requires an acceptance of the ICRC’s continuous combat function construct—whose 
reach and limiting principles remain subject to debate—or a more robust targeting theory 
equating fighters in NIACs to privileged combatants in IACs. Finally, if there is an obligation to 
endeavor to capture a dangerous individual before killing him or her, from whence does such an 
obligation flow—the jus ad bellum, IHL, IHRL, or domestic law principles of proportionality 
and due process?  
Determining the legality of these events also requires a consideration of the normative 
relationship between multiple potentially applicable bodies of law, including the jus ad bellum, 
                                                          
396
 See Pub. Committee Ag. Torture, supra n.205. 
397
 See, e.g., Al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009). In the context of cases involving the capture of enemy 
combatants, courts have characterized the US as “outside a zone of combat.” Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 698 
(2d Cir. 2003). 
Not for Citation or Attribution.  Forthcoming: 14 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2012). 
53 
 
the jus in bello, and human rights law. While it has been argued that IHL displaces IHRL, IHL 
may also displace other targeting theories, such as national self-defense, as independent 
rationales for these types of operations. Most of the debate on doctrinal hierarchies has focused 
on when and to what degree IHRL constrains actors engaged in armed conflicts governed by 
IHL; as such, there is little to suggest that IHRL does not apply in full force to pure self-defense 
operations absent a state of armed conflict.  
This legal indeterminacy and doctrinal overlap has been lamented as a consequence of the 
“fragmentation” of international law.398 This is, however, an inapt metaphor as it presumes a 
primordial whole that has since disintegrated. The fact that multiple conclusions on legality are 
possible is more likely due to the fact that modern conflicts and counterterrorism operations—
which take place transnationally and outside of traditional theaters of war against non-state 
actors who countenance no limitations on their own actions whatsoever—generate novel legal 
questions that invoke multiple legal regimes. Secondary rules of recognition, interpretation, and 
choice of law have yet to catch up. Furthermore, notwithstanding the evolution of today’s acute 
threats to world order, it has been decades since the existing IHL treaties were negotiated and 
drafted.  
In all systems of law, regulatory gaps produce legal uncertainty but also a freedom to act. Thus, 
in the absence of clear legal rules, states are—in essence—free to choose a course of action. This 
suggests that while jurisprudentially discredited,
399
 the legal legacy of the Lotus case—which set 
forth the proposition that what is not expressly forbidden by international law is permitted—
continues to exert a strong gravitational pull.
400
 There may, however, be consequences to acting 
along the edge of the law even in the absence of clear proscriptions, mandatory jurisdiction, 
and robust enforcement institutions. Negative repercussions may be diplomatic, reputational, and 
political. Furthermore, there remains the risk that where international reaction to controversial 
events is muted—for whatever reason—customary international law may evolve in ways that are 
ultimately undesirable.
401
  
These observations also have implications for whether states should—as a matter of legal 
obligation or prudence—justify their actions when they choose to operate on the outer bounds of 
positive law.
402
 On the one hand, it could be argued that legal indeterminacy behooves 
governments to provide insight into the relevant facts, legal theories, and analyses—consistent 
with national security concerns—so that the international community can evaluate the state’s 
claims to legality and shape the development of law with their reaction. The remarks by 
Brennan
403
 and Koh
404
 reflect this approach, although the reported withholding of the 
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justificatory al-Aulaqi memorandum suggests a contrary impulse.
405
 On the other hand, of 
course, enabling such scrutiny may aid the enemy by revealing means and methods of war; it 
may also generate statements against interest in the event that a judicial forum does eventually 
assert jurisdiction over some aspect of a controversial operation. Moreover, states are not 
monolithic entities, and it may be impossible to formulate a definitive legal theory justifying 
actions of this nature.
406
 Articulating the legal, factual, and political basis for engaging in 
controversial conduct, however, will go far toward ensuring that such actions are treated as 
exceptional rather than precedential. 
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